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This dissertation seeks to expose through a systemic approach the complexity and 
centrality of governance in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). 
This is premised on the hypothesis that an appreciation of this complexity and of drawing 
analytic distinctions between governance and management is necessary for successful 
interventions. 
The study adopts community-based environmental governance (CBEG) as the core 
heuristic variable in a conceptual framework for analysing CBNRM. The application of 
this framework generates empirical evidence concerning CBNRM processes adopted in 
the Kafue Flats socio-biophysical system. It is illustrated that CBNRM processes are 
established and implemented in a complex context. It is observed that social actors on the 
Kafue Flats usually do not constructively understand and appreciate this complexity. 
Several examples are demonstrated in which the thinking and actions of these actors 
reflect a limited conceptual framework of systems thinking and the inherent complexity 
in CBNRM. It is illustrated that these actors do not appreciate that CBNRM is a 
significant component of the governance of natural resource utilisation. This lack of 
appreciation is essentially identified as a contributing factor to poor performance. 
Ultimately, CBNRM processes are not only about sustainable use of natural resources; 
but also the nature and quality of relationships amongst social actors in CBEG. By 
drawing attention to these relationships, this study broadens our understanding of what 
goes into CBNRM processes. The implications of ignoring these relationships can be 
detrimental to the success of CBNRM. Accordingly, the establishment of productive 
CBNRM systems depends on how firmly CBEG issues and concerns are incorporated 
into CBNRM analyses and operations. Evidently, CBNRM cannot be pragmatically 
pursued in rigid socio-biophysical settings. It requires systemic and structural changes in 
the socio-political, economic and cultural mechanisms of CBEG. Thus, all cooperating 
partners, governments included, should accept that CBEG and CBNRM are inseparable. 
This understanding necessitates them to spearhead CBEG capacity building schemes at 
international, national and local levels. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TRENDS IN BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation seeks to expose through a systemic approach the complexity and 
centrality of governance in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). It 
is based on the premise that an appreciation of this complexity and of drawing analytic 
distinctions between governance and management is necessary for successful 
interventions. This chapter serves as a background by providing an overview of the trends 
in biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. It consists of five sections: 
biological diversity, approaches to biodiversity conservation, integrating human and 
biophysical systems, Africa's complex socio-biophysical context, statement of the 
problem, aim and objectives of the study, and structure of the dissertation. 
1.2 Biological diversity 
Biological diversity or biodiversity is a concept that has become one of the major themes 
in the environment and development lexicon (McNeely et aI., 1990; Noss, 1990; Falloux 
and Talbot, 1993; Bennun et al., 1995). The concept denotes different things to different 
people, and a great deal of uncertainty exists as to its meaning (Noss, 1990; Bennun et 
aI., 1995). The most widely used approach to defining biodiversity refers to the variety of 
genes, species and ecosystems, and the ecological processes of which they are part 
(McNeely et aI., 1990; Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Bennun et aI., 1995). This approach is 
different to Noss's (1990) who, instead of defining, characterises biodiversity into three 
primary attributes at different levels of biological organisation. These attributes are: 
composition, structure and function. According to Noss (1990), the three attributes make 
up and determine a region's biodiversity. He asserts that this approach provides "a useful 
conceptual framework for identifying specific, measurable indicators to monitor change 
and assess the overall status of biodiversity" (Noss, 1990: 356). 
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Biological resources (such as genes, species and ecosystems) that have value to people 
are the physical manifestation of the earth's biodiversity (McNeely et al., 1990). These 
resources provide the fundamental basis for life on earth, including humans. The 
maintenance of biodiversity is thus critical to the survival of living things on earth. 
However, the continued loss of biodiversity is presently happening at an alarming rate 
(McNeely et al., 1990). The extinction of plant and animal species is one of the most 
serious environmental concerns facing mankind (McNeely et al., 1990; Falloux and 
Talbot, 1993; Bennun et al., 1995). 
The threats to biodiversity are complex and include habitat destruction, pollution and 
over-exploitation (Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000). In 
spite of the critical role biodiversity plays in human development, the unsustainable use 
of biological resources has continued to have an enormous impact on biodiversity (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; McNeely et al., 1990; Falloux and 
Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994; Bennun et al., 1995). Although current approaches for 
conserving biodiversity have tended to focus on protected areas, biodiversity 
conservation must ultimately become more integrative and innovative (McNeely et al., 
1990; Walker, 2000). This calls for continuous investment of effort from both the 
governmental and non-governmental entities, and requires increased resources, including 
fmance, personnel and political commitment, to protect and preserve biodiversity (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; McNeely et al., 1990; Falloux and 
Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994). 
1.3 Approaches to biodiversity conservation 
A number of conventional approaches that have been put in place to protect and preserve 
biodiversity can be identified. These include establishing regulatory frameworks, species 
protections, and habitat protection (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987; McNeely et aI., 1990; Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994; 
Bennun et al., 1995). The process of establishing regulatory frameworks is usually the 
first step towards most biodiversity conservation strategies and in most instances involves 
establishing national policies and laws (McNeely et aI. , 1990; Murphree, 1994). It is 
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partly because of this that many governments have been undertaking policy 
transformations required for sustainable utilisation of biological resources (McNeely et 
ai., 1990). These governments have subsequently established policy and legislative 
frameworks that seek to promote biodiversity conservation (McNeely et ai., 1990). 
Most of the policies and legislation formulated by governments have, however, often 
contributed to the depletion of biological resources (McNeely et aI., 1990; Falloux and 
Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994; Bennun et aI., 1995). National policies that influence 
biodiversity conservation through processes such as land and resource tenure policy 
reforms, agricultural-based rural development, and the decentralisation of natural 
resource management have had enormous impacts on the conservation of biodiversity 
(McNeely et ai., 1990). For example, the introduction of state subsidies for forest 
clearing in Brazil led to an increase in deforestation (McNeely et ai., 1990). It is thus 
important to recognise and appreciate that there are critical linkages between biological 
conservation and other sectors such as agriculture, tourism, water resource development, 
research, fisheries and rural development (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987; McNeely et ai., 1990; Murphree, 1994). These linkages should be 
harnessed through the coordination of policies to promote effective biodiversity 
conservation. 
Species protection is an approach that focuses on the protection and conservation of 
particular species (McNeely et ai., 1990; Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994). 
McNeely et al. (1990) argue that since species are the building blocks of ecosystems, 
they can be used as indicators of ecosystem health. It is for this important ecological 
principle that governments, NGOs and international agencies have paid particular 
attention to the species component of biodiversity (McNeely et ai., 1990). International 
measures to protect particular species from over-exploitation have included the 
following: International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; and the Convention 
on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. National measures have mostly 
protected wild species and have included hunting regulations, protective legislation, and a 
range of wildlife conservation activities (World Commission on Environment and 
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Development, 1987; McNeely et al., 1990; Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Bennun et al., 
1995). 
In spite of the effectiveness of the species protection approach in preserving biodiversity, 
it is generally accepted that species are better conserved as parts of larger ecosystems 
(McNeely et al., 1990; Bennun et al. , 1995). This is because they are able to successfully 
adapt to the ever-changing environmental conditions within their respective communities 
(McNeely et al., 1990). It is for this reason that governments have been concentrating on 
measures to protect particular habitats, such as within national parks and reserves 
(McNeely et al. , 1990). International measures in this approach have included the 
following: Convention on Wetlands of International Importance; the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; and UNESCO's 
Biosphere Reserves Programme (McNeely et al., 1990; Bennun et al., 1995). At the 
national level, governments have put in place measures to protect or regulate the use of 
habitats that are critical to biodiversity conservation. These measures have included: 
national legislation establishing national parks and reserves; local laws protecting 
particular forests, reefs, or wetlands; regulations incorporated within concession 
agreements; restrictions on certain types of land; and customary law protecting sacred 
graves or other special sites (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987; McNeely et al. , 1990; Bennun et al., 1995). 
Although habitat protection measures are considered to be effective and efficient in 
preserving biodiversity, it is now widely accepted that ex situ measures can also be 
applied when conserving critical components of biodiversity (Kiss, 1990; McNeely et al., 
1990). Ex situ measures refer to "off-site facilities and amenities used in biodiversity 
conservation programmes" (McNeely et al. , 1990: 28). These measures include botanic 
gardens, game farms, captive breeding programmes in zoos, and gene banks (Kiss, 1990; 
Falloux and Talbot, 1993). Generally, ex situ measures can be effectively used to provide 
"insurance" protection against the extinction of particular wild species populations of 
plants and animals that have reached very alarming low levels in the wild (McNeely et 
al. , 1990). 
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The above discourse has described some of the conventional approaches that have been 
used to protect and preserve biodiversity. Although simplified, these approaches 
represent a set of actions that can promote effective biodiversity conservation. However, 
it is now widely accepted that the success of these approaches greatly depends on how 
well they ultimately correspond to the needs and aspirations of present and future human 
generations (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; Kiss, 1990; 
McNeely et al., 1990; Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994; Bennun et al., 1995; 
ART, 1999; Gibson, 1999; Veit, 1999). Importantly, it is only by bringing together the 
human and biophysical systems that biodiversity conservation approaches can correspond 
with the needs and aspirations of human beings (Veit, 1999). 
1.4 Integrating human and biophysical systems 
There have been several global efforts aimed at bringing together the human and 
biophysical systems (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; 
McNeely et aI., 1990; Murphree, 1994; Bennun et aI., 1995). In 1984, the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was commissioned by the 
United Nations to identify strategies for dealing with the rapid degradation of the natural 
environment (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). In 1987, the 
Commission (also known as the Brundtland Commission) submitted their report, entitled 
Our Common Future, to the United Nations (Regency Press Corporation, 1992). This 
report contains the most widely quoted definition of sustainable development. It defmes 
sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: 43). Although the satisfaction of 
human needs is the essence of this development approach, the constraints imposed by the 
limited capacity of the earth to continually meet present and future needs are also 
emphasised (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Thus, 
economic and social development goals are defined in terms of sustainability. 
The Brundtland Commission paved the way for the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit (Regency 
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Press Corporation, 1992). This Conference approved a set of five agreements: Agenda 
21, the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, the Statement of Principles on 
Forests, the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. These agreements established for all countries a series of stepping 
stones towards a more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable world 
(Regency Press Corporation, 1992). Subsequently, several governments established 
national action plans to deal with human needs and the sustainable use and conservation 
of the environment. These national plans were backed up with specific programmes for 
sustainable development based on broad public participation and community involvement 
(Regency Press Corporation, 1992). This was in recognition of the fact that sustainable 
development cannot be achieved without greater citizen participation in decision-making 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
In Africa, citizen participation in decision-making processes has mostly been advanced 
through the decentralisation of natural resource management and utilisation on which 
rural local people depend (Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Murphree, 1994; Bennun et at., 
1995; Veit, 1999). Governments have started to acknowledge the political rights of rural 
local people, and have thus been establishing management systems that allow these 
people to participate in environmental decision-making processes. This has come about 
partly due to the realisation that in no other place can the complex interrelationships 
among socio-politics, economics and natural resource management be more explicit than 
in Africa (Gibson, 1999; Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999). 
1.5 Africa's complex socio-biophysical context 
Logic and evidence have shown that Africa's environmental dilemma can be traced in its 
complex socio-biophysical context (OSSREA, 1998; ART, 1999; Veit, 1999). Three 
reasons are advanced to explain the root ofthis complex context in which Africa's natural 
resource management is embedded. Firstly, the colonial era saw the alienation of land by 
the colonial powers to establish national parks and game reserves (ART, 1999). The 
establishment of these protected areas without the participation of indigenous people in 
decision-making and benefits distribution has been a major source of conflicts and 
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poverty (Kiss, 1990; ART, 1999; Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999). It is partly 
because of these conflicts and poverty that ecological stress has been at the hub of much 
of the socio-political and economic crisis in Africa (Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 
1999). 
Secondly, the lack of effective participation by local people in the decision-making and 
benefits distribution processes of natural resource management have continued into the 
post-colonial era (Gibson, 1999; Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999). Post-colonial 
governments have been establishing and implementing policy, legislative and 
institutional frameworks for natural resource management without the effective 
participation of local people. This has led to conflicts between government machineries 
and local people, resulting in uncontrolled and unsustainable utilisation of wildlife 
resources (Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999). 
Thirdly, as a result of internal and cross border conflicts, the post-colonial era has 
witnessed the marginalisation of land and its occupants (Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 
. . 
1999). Consequently, the majority of people have been busy struggling for socio-political 
survival, which has resulted in the over-exploitation of natural resources (Okoth-Ogendo 
and Tumushabe, 1999). This situation has been compounded by the fact that most 
governments have been affected by the crisis of illegitimacy arising from perpetual 
conflicts (Veit, 1999). The affected governments have been unable to effectively address 
the emergent problems of natural resources degradation (Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 
1999). 
Against this backdrop, it is now widely acknowledged that as long as natural resources 
continue to play an important role in the socio-politics and economies of rural Africa, the 
rural communities will continue to challenge conservation policies through illegal 
utilisation (Kiss, 1990; ART, 1999; Gibson, 1999; Veit, 1999). The important role of 
natural resources implies that both the distribution and redistribution of power over these 
resources will continue to be challenged (Gibson, 1999). 
Drawing on the complex socio-biophysical context of Africa's natural resources, it is 
argued that the governance of natural resource utilisation is a significant and arguably 
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one of the most important components of sustainable development (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). Importantly, effective governance can be used as a powerful tool to 
promote sustainable natural resource utilisation (Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999). 
On the other hand, sustainable natural resource utilisation can also support effective 
governance (Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999; Veit, 1999). 
Consequently, the search for answers to the depletion of Africa's natural resources has 
been driven by factors that are deep-rooted in governance processes on one hand, and 
natural resource management on the other hand (ART, 1999). In the last two decades, this 
search has focused on the establishment and strengthening of community-based systems 
to promote sustainable utilisation of natural resources (ART, 1999). These systems are 
commonly referred to as community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) 
systems (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995; Dimbi, 1998; Maughan-Brown, 1998; ART, 1999; 
Namanha, 1999; Abacar, 2000). Essentially, they seek to promote community 
participation in natural resource management by giving rural local communities an 
effective say over the use of natural resources (ART, 1999). 
1.6 Statement of the problem 
Given Africa's complex socio-biophysical context, it is surprising that many of the 
conventional approaches to CBNRM have neither been taking account of this complexity, 
nor been drawing analytic distinctions between governance and natural resource 
management when dealing with emerging problems (see for example, lIED, 1994; Dimbi, 
1998; ART, 1999; Namanha, 1999; Abacar, 2000). These approaches have not 
constructively appreciated the critical interrelationships between governance and natural 
resource management that underlie these problems (Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; 
Cohen, 2001). They have employed reductionist methods to focus on single variables, 
such as participation, leadership and collaboration, without acknowledging that CBNRM 
systems are complex systems made up of many interrelated components that make up the 
system as a whole (IIED, 1994; Barrow and Murphree, 1998; Dimbi, 1998). 
Given the complexity associated with CBNRM, it is argued that societies need a variety 
of new and better intellectual tools to facilitate the appreciation of this complexity, and 
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the interrelationships between governance and natural resource management (Senge, 
1990; Kay and Foster, 1999; Cohen, 2001). The reductionist methods described above 
can no longer be considered as a valid approach to CNBRM (Senge, 1990). There is a 
growing understanding that sustainability issues and concerns cannot be explored or 
discussed in isolation, but need to be examined within their broader context (Kay and 
Foster, 1999). Insights into the problems associated with sustainability demand a full 
appreciation and understanding of the underlying interrelationships, processes and 
patterns of change (Senge, 1990; Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; Cohen, 2001). 
Kay and Foster (1999) argue that the greatest challenge of sustainability has been how to 
deal with the associated complexity. This understanding calls for holistic and systemic 
approaches that can serve as the foundation for sustainable development (Kay and Foster, 
1999). Such approaches should recognise the synergies and constraints between 
governance and natural resources management processes (Walker, 2000). 
It is in the light of the above discourse that this thesis sought to expose the complexity 
and centrality of governance issues in CBNRM through a systemic approach. This was 
based on the premise that an appreciation of this complexity and of drawing analytic 
distinctions between governance and management processes is necessary for successful 
interventions. 
1.7 Aim and objectives 
The main aim of this study was to expose through a systemic approach the complexity 
and centrality of governance in CBNRM. Its specific objectives were to: 
.:. Construct a conceptual framework based on environmental governance that can 
facilitate the systemic analysis of CBNRM; 
.:. Apply the conceptual framework to identify and describe the roles of the Government 
of Zambia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership; 
.:. Apply the conceptual framework to assess the effectiveness of the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership; 
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.:. Revisit the conceptual framework to explore the challenges and opportunities of 
applying it at a broader scale. 
1.8 Structure of the dissertation 
In order to set the context for constructing the conceptual framework, the following 
chapter (chapter 2) will present the description of the study area. Firstly, the presentation 
commences with the country profile of Zambia. This profile provides an overview of how 
the national socio-political, economic and cultural challenges and opportunities have 
evolved overtime. Secondly, the presentation explores the implications of these changes 
for the study area. 
Chapter 3 constructs and presents the conceptual framework based on environmental 
governance for analysing CBNRM initiatives. The chapter is basically made up of three 
main parts. The first part presents the main concepts and definitions, which are central to 
this study. The rationale behind the conceptual framework is presented in the second part. 
The third part systemically constructs and presents the conceptual framework. 
In chapter 4, the conceptual framework is applied to identify and describe the roles of the 
two main social actors in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. These actors are designated 
into governmental and non-governmental entities. 
Chapter 5 assesses the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership guided by the conceptual 
framework. The five properties (support for effective CBEG, shared governance, 
participation, accountability and transparency) of an effective CBNRM partnership 
identified by the framework establish the criteria against which to assess this partnership. 
The challenge of chapter 6 is to explore the application of the conceptual framework at a 
broader scale by general ising from the fmdings. 
11 
CHAPTER TWO 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA 
2.1 Zambia - country profile 
Zambia is a land-locked country found in central Africa. The country has a total area of 
752,610 km2 and lies between latitudes 8° south and 22° and 33° east (Gibson, 1999). As 
depicted in Figure 2.1, her neighbours are Angola to the west, Malawi to the east, Zaire 
and Tanzania to the north, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to the south, and Botswana and 
Namibia to the southwest. It lies on the Central African Plateau, at an altitude of around 
1000 m with hills and mountains rising to nearly 2000 m (Gibson, 1999). Four large 
rivers cut through this plateau. Three of these, the Zambezi, Kafue and Luangwa, belong 
to the Zambezi catchment, whilst the Luapula belongs to the Congo catchment (IUCN, 
1992). 
In 2000, the population of Zambia was estimated to be 10 million with a population 
growth rate of2.12% (World Guide, 1999). The country is considered to be one the most 
urbanised in southern Africa, with a little over 50% of its population living in urban 
settlements (COMESA, 2000). However, it also has one of the lowest population 
densities: lOA persons per km2 (COMESA, 2000). The population consists of numerous 
ethnic groups (GRZIECZ, 1995). There are approximately 73 different dialects spoken in 
the country and these are divided into seven main language groups: Bemba, Nyanja, 
Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale and Kaonde (GRZIECZ, 1995). English has been adopted as 
the official language and is widely spoken and understood (World Guide, 1999). The 
literacy levels (defmed as 15 years and above who can read and write English) of the total 
population stand at 78% (World Guide, 1999). 
In 1964, the country became an independent state (Gibson, 1992). It was previously 
colonised by the British (World Guide, 1999). In 1972, it became a one-party 
participatory democracy (COMESA, 2000). The president was the Head of State as well 
as president of a party called the United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Gibson, 
1992). In the one-party participatory democracy, the president had full executive powers, 
including responsibility for national defence and security (World Guide, 1999). 
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Figure 2.1 Map showing Zambia and her neighbours. 
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In 1991, the multiparty system of government was introduced (COMESA, 2000). 
Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the same year, and the Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) won 125 seats in the 150-seat National Assembly 
(COMESA, 2000). These elections were judged free and fair by international observers 
(World Guide, 1999). 
The country's economy is highly dependent on the exploitation and export of copper and 
other base metals such as lead and zinc (Gibson, 1999; COMESA, 2000). Zambia was 
and continues to be a mono-economy, based on copper production (Gibson, 1999). The 
huge fmancial earnings from the international copper sales made the country to be the 
envy of the continent (World Guide, 1999). At independence copper accounted for 60% 
of GDP and 53% of government revenue (World Guide, 1999). This also represented 
92% of foreign exchange earnings. In the early 1970s, world copper prices dropped 
significantly, undennining the ability of the government to implement its development 
plans (COMESA, 2000). The contribution of copper to GDP fell to 13% and 40% of its 
value was lost (COMESA, 2000). 
The economic crisis in Zambia forced the government to change its economic policy and 
restructure the economy away from over-dependency on the copper mining sector (World 
Guide, 1999). Agriculture and rural development were accorded a high priority as being 
the sectors of greatest potential for replacing the mining sector (World Guide, 1999). The 
priority accorded to agriculture and rural development was reflected in the proportion of 
the government development budget allocated to agriculture, which rose from 11 % in 
1974176 to 30% in the mid and late 1980s (World Guide, 1999). 
Since 1990, the country had been rapidly moving towards the privatisation of much of its 
public sector (COMESA, 2000). The government had privati sed some 210 of the state 
owned enterprises including Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (COMESA, 
2000). The privatisation programme was one of the cornerstones of the government's 
policy of developing the private sector and liberalising the economy (COMESA, 2000). It 
was being implemented under the World Bank's New Economic Recovery Programme 
(NERP) (COMESA, 2000). 
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In 1998, the GDP at current market prices was US$ 5,463 million (World Guide, 1999). 
The principal exports were valued at US$ 1.01 billion and included copper, zinc, cobalt 
and tobacco. On the other hand, the principal imports were valued at US$ 1.13 billion and 
included machinery, transportation equipment, foodstuffs, fuels and manufactured goods 
(World Guide, 1999). Although the agricultural sector accounted for only 20% ofGDP, it 
provides a livelihood for about 50% of Zambia's population (COMESA, 2000). The 
sector is characterised by a relatively small modem sector of about 1000 heavily 
capitalised farmers on one hand, about 700,000 farming families using hand hoe/or ox-
cultivation on the other hand (COMESA, 2000). 
Poverty has increased under the economic structural adjustment programme being 
implemented by the government (GRZIECZ, 1995; World Guide, 1999). The formal 
sector has fallen substantially with the trimming down of the manufacturing and civil 
service sectors (World Guide, 1999). The informal sector has not been able to absorb all 
of the affected workers. The effects of the economic structural adjustment programme are 
most felt by the poor rural, whose rural incomes have drastically declined. The 
government's actions in the agriculture sector have worsened this situation through the 
removal of fertiliser subsidies, the withdrawal of marketing services, and the failure to 
replace food subsidies with adequate safety nets (Davies, 1999). 
More than 20% of Zambia's total land area (752 610km 2) falls into wildlife management 




34 Game Management Areas (165 000 km ). These areas represent some of Zambia's 
most valuable assets and the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZA W A), formerly Department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), is responsible for protecting and 
managing them (GRZIECZ, 1995). The land in the National Parks is treated as State land, 
while land in the GMAs is under customary tenure, though the ZA W A has to be 
consulted for any land allocation and use by the traditional leaders (Davies, 1999). In 
accordance with Section 3(4) of the Land Act (1995), the President cannot alienate any 
land held under customary tenure in a GMA without consulting the Chief in the area and 
the Director-General of the ZA W A. This also applies to the conversion of customary 
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tenure into leasehold tenure where both the Chief and the Director-General have to be 
consulted before any alienation. 
The country's primary environmental problems are closely related to poverty, which the 
economic structural adjustment programme has exacerbated, rather than alleviated 
(GRZIECZ, 1995; World Guide, 1999). The problems include wildlife depletion, 
deforestation, loss of soil fertility, and urban water pollution (GRZIECZ, 1995). The 
wildlife management areas mentioned above are under growing pressure from poaching, 
encroaching human settlement and alternative land uses, such as agriculture (Gibson, 
1999). The economic structural adjustment programme has encouraged poaching insofar 
as it has contributed to rural poverty and urban unemployment (World Guide, 1999). 
Deforestation has also accelerated during the years of this programme. Although 45% of 
the country's land area is still forested, deforestation is averaging 2.6% annually (World 
Guide, 1999). Land clearing caused by both commercial agriculture and shifting 
cultivation is largely responsible for this deforestation (World Guide, 1999). 
2.2 The study area • Kafue Flats 
The Kafue Flats is located in central, southern Zambia (15°20' - 15°55'S; 26° - 28°E) 
(GRZIECZ, 1995). It is a flood-plain wetland between the Itezhi-tezhi and Kafue Gorges, 
and covers an area of approximately 6,500 km2 (Jeffery, 1993). The area has two 
National Parks (Blue Lagoon and Lochinvar) and a Game Management Area (divided 
into North and South Banks). It has a minimum elevation of 1065 m, with a mean annual 
temperature of 20.6°C (IUCN, 1992). The mean annual rainfall of the area is 838 mm 
(IUCN, 1992). The area has two main types of soils namely, Kafue clays and Kafue basin 
alluvium. The main vegetation types have been identified as termitaria, grasslands and 
woodlands (IUCN, 1992). 
The Kafue Flats is an important refuge for wildlife including Kafue lechwe (Kobus leche 
kafuensis) and zebra (Equus burchelli) (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1 992b). The 
Kafue lechwe is a subspecies endemic to Zambia and the Kafue Flats (Jeffery, 1993). The 
other species that also occur, but in limited numbers, include wildebeest (Conno-chaetes 
taurinus), buffalo (Syncerus caffer), roan antelope (Hippotragus niger), kudu 
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(Trage/aphus strepsiceros) and hippo (Hippopotamus ampibius) (Jeffery, 1993). Small 
mammals also have a wide occurrence and bird life is abundant. Although wildlife 
resources are specially important, the wetland is also important for fisheries, livestock 
grazing and water resources (IUCN, 1992). 
The Kafue Flats is considered of great importance to international, national and local 
interests (Jeffery, 1993; GRZIECZ, 1995). International interests mainly include 
conservation, preservation, research, education, recreation, tourism and safari hunting. 
These interests are mainly expressed in international multilateral and bilateral activities 
(Jeffery, 1993). In 1991, for example, the government ratified the Ramsar Convention 
(GRZIECZ, 1995)1. Through this convention, the Kafue Flats became an area that has 
been designated as a wetland of international importance (GRZIECZ, 1995). Therefore, 
as party to the convention, the government is under obligation to implement the 
objectives of the convention (GRZIECZ, 1995). The objectives of the convention call for 
sustainable utilisation of wetland's natural resources for the benefit of humankind. 
At the national level, interests include water supply, hydroelectric power generation, 
irrigation, livestock production, farming, hunting and tourism (Jeffery, 1993). These 
national interests led the government to create policies and laws designed to protect the 
natural resources of the Kafue Flats (GRZIECZ, 1995). In 1972, for example, the 
National Parks and GMAs mentioned above were established in the area (WWF-Zambia 
Wetlands Project, I 992b). The National Parks were designed to preserve representative 
samples of the country's natural environment for the enjoyment and education of the 
general public (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, I 992b). Major development activities, 
such as public roads and residential houses, are legally controlled and restricted in the 
National Parks (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). The GMAs adjacent to the 
National Parks function as a buffer zone (GRZIECZ, 1995i, Different interests are 
'Zambia is signatory to several other international conventions and treaties which have implications for the 
conservation and management of the Kafue Flats. These include Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Framework on Climate Change, Convention to Combat Desertification, Convention on Migratory Species 
and World Heritage Convention. See GRZ (1995). 
~he term buffer zone refers to a "physically delineated area, either within or adjacent to a protected area, 
where land use is partially restricted" (lIED, 1994: 10). In the case of Zambia, the activities in such areas 
aim to conserve natural resources through the promotion of socio-economic development among local 
communities adjacent to protected areas (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). 
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accommodated within this buffer zone (yVWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). 
Local interests include livestock grazing, subsistence fanning, fishing and illegal wildlife 
hunting (Jeffery, 1993). These interests have been and continue to play significant roles 
in the lives of the local people on the Kafue Flats (Jeffery, 1993; GRZIECZ, 1995). The 
livelihoods of most of the local rural residents largely depend on these resources 
(GRZIECZ, 1995). For example, according to the IUCN (1992), illegal wildlife hunting 
plays a very important role in the economies and diets of the local communities. Game 
meat is regarded as a luxury and highly appreciated by the local people (WWF-Zambia 
Wetlands Project, 1992b). Pastoralism, which includes commons grazing, is a significant 
cultural activity for the local people (Jeffery, 1993). The local communities seasonally 
drive their herds of cattle to the interior of the Kafue Flats where there is enough pasture 
and water (Jeffery, 1993). Fishing is also an important economic activity, but is most 
practised by immigrant populations (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). 
The human population of the Kafue Flats area is about 120,000 (WWF-Zambia Wetlands 
Project, 1992b). Communities are predominately lIas and Tongas who are traditionally 
cattle pastoralists (Jeffery, 1993). These ethnic groups densely populate the periphery of 
the wetland (Jeffery, 1993). Although cattle are their prime economic concern, maize 
cultivation plays an important subsistence role in their livelihood strategies (IUCN, 
1992). There is also another ethnic group known as BaTwa, which is genetically regarded 
as being between Bushmen and Pygmy (Jeffery, 1993). This group has a life style quite 
different from the lIa and Tonga, and is mostly engaged in fishing and semi-permanent 
hoe cultivation (Jeffery, 1993). There is also an immigrant population of fishermen 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). The BaTwa and the immigrant popUlations 
inhabit the centre of the wetland (Kiss, 1990). The levels of employment are low amongst 
these communities, and as a result, they are generally poor and frequently suffer from 
poor nutrition and poor health (IUCN, 1992). The overall percentage of absent migrants 
is very low with about 30% of adult males in the whole area, and as low as 15% in the 
wealthiest cattle areas (IUCN, 1992). 
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For a long time local communities were legally excluded from wetlands utilisation and 
management practices on the Kafue Flats (IUCN, 1992). The ideals of such philosophies 
were reflected in the establishment of protected areas on the Kafue Flats (Kiss, 1990). 
The natural resources in these protected areas were regarded as international and national 
assets, and the needs of the local communities were seen as a threat to the successful 
management of the resources in the protected areas (IUCN, 1992). Consequently, the 
voices of local communities were excluded and not considered in decision-making 
processes pertaining to natural resource management and utilisation (IUCN, 1992). 
However, the exclusion of local communities from decision-making in the management 
and utilisation of natural resources was politically and socio-culturally contrary to the 
values and norms of the local communities on the Kafue Flats (Jeffery, 1993). 
Historically chiefs on the Kafue Flats provided political leadership in the management 
and utilisation of natural resources (IUCN, 1992; Jeffery, 1993). The chiefs strictly 
controlled traditional hunting by local hunters (GRZIECZ, 1995). They also ensured that 
local hunters adhered to traditional hunting practices (GRZIECZ, 1995). More 
importantly, the authority and responsibility for managing the natural resources were 
vested in the chief who provided political and socio-cultural leadership to the local 
communities (Jeffery, 1993). Thus, local communities did not take lightly the decision by 
external authorities (both colonial and post-colonial governments) to remove authority 
and responsibility from their chiefs (IUCN, 1992). As a result, the attitudes of the local 
communities towards protected natural resources on the Kafue Flats became hostile 
(IUCN, 1992). 
The alienation of natural resources to international and national interests had major 
implications for the local communities on the Kafue Flats (Jeffery, 1993). Hunting played 
a very important role in the lives of the local communities who hunted as part of their 
subsistence strategies (GRZIECZ, 1995). Game meat provided them with an important 
source of protein (IUCN, 1992). They also used game meat as a means of exchange 
(Kiss, 1990). This was especially common when local people had to travel to distant 
places leaving their homes (Kiss, 1990). Therefore, the alienation of natural resources, 
particularly wildlife, signified the loss of important economic resources and of cultural 
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activities associated with hunting practices (GRZIECZ, 1995). 
The weakening of the Zambian national economy in the 1970s worsened the economic 
plight of the local communities on the Kafue Flats (IDCN, 1992). In the 1960s, the high 
revenues from copper production enabled the Zambian government to significantly 
improve rural economies (GRZIECZ, 1995). According to Gibson (1999), government 
services in the rural areas were comparatively of high standard during this period. 
Through its various ministries, the government managed to improve rural social services 
and to build rural infrastructure (Gibson, 1999). However, in the early 1970s, 
government's support to the rural economies drastically declined due to reduced 
international copper prices (Gibson, 1999). This worsened the economic conditions of the 
rural communities who had no other options but to increasingly depend on the natural 
resources (Gibson, 1999). The illegal hunting of the Kafue lechwe in the Kafue Flats 
increased to very alarming levels (GRZIECZ, 1995). In the early 1980s, the population of 
this endemic animal sub-species reduced to about 40 000 from an historical population of 
over 200000 (Jeffery, 1993). 
The above description of the study area provides the context in which the conceptual 
framework for this study was developed. The Kafue Flats provides an excellent example 
of inextricably linked socio-economic and biophysical systems, or simply socio-
biophysical systems. The challenge is how to manage this system so as to foster the 
principles and practices sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
For a long time now, governments in southern Africa have been confining environmental 
management to merely scientific and technical issues and concerns (Murphree, 1996; 
ART, 1999; Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999). This is particularly the case with 
CBNRM, where the newly devised approaches to community participation have been 
operating without taking into consideration broader governance issues and concerns 
(Lyons, 1999). However, through the concept of environmental governance (Mugabe and 
Tumushabe, 1999; Okoth-Ogendo and Tumushabe, 1999; Veit, 1999), it is now 
recognised that there are critical linkages between governance and environmental 
management systems. Therefore, conceptual frameworks that restrict Africa's CBNRM 
schemes to scientific and technical concerns expose themselves to the risks of omitting 
the broader governance issues that define the relationships amongst social actors. 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a conceptual framework based on 
environmental governance for analysing CBNRM schemes. Basically, the chapter 
consists of three parts. The first part presents the main concepts and defmitions, which 
are central to this study. The second part explains the rationale behind the conceptual 
framework. The third part presents the conceptual framework. This framework is 
designed to facilitate the analysis of a case study of the Kafue Flats of Zambia. 
3.2 Concepts and definitions 
3.2.1 Complexity 
It is now generally accepted that the world is increasingly becoming more complex than 
was previously anticipated (Senge, 1990; McCarthy, 1996; Kay and Foster, 1999; 
Walker, 2000; Cohen, 2001; Foster et al., 2001). The problems that emerge from this 
complexity are inherently multi-scale and involve interactions across different variables 
(McCarthy, 1996). Senge (1990: 69) explicates the scale of the complexity in a vivid 
manner: 
"Perhaps for the first time in history, humankind has the capacity to create far more information 
than anyone can absorb, to foster far greater interdependency than anyone can manage, and to 
accelerate change far faster than anyone's ability to keep pace. Certainly the scale of complexity 
is without precedent." 
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In this study, two methods for designating the different types of complexity are 
identified. The first was coined by Weaver (1948) for complex situations and problems 
(in Foster et ai., 2001). This method is based on the number of interactions among or 
between variables. The problems produced through these interactions are partitioned 
according to their complexity and level of randomness. As depicted in Figure 3.1, 
organised (not random) simplicity represents situations with small numbers of 
interactions such as that found in machines. Problems emerging from this complexity are 
referred to as "small-number" problems. Weaver contends that such problems are a 
purview of reductionist and mechanistic methods. Unorganised complexity is represented 
by large numbers of random interactions. It is characterised by aggregate behaviour and 
"large number" problems, which are a purview of statistics. Organised complexity 
represents situations with intermediate number of interactions. It is associated with 













Figure 3.1 Partitioning of problem situations (after Weaver 1948 in Foster et al., 2001). 
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The second method was proposed by Senge (1990) and is based on two types of 
complexities: detail and dynamic complexities. Detail complexity simply refers to 
problems and situations that involve several variables (Senge, 1990). A given example of 
this complexity is when one is mixing many ingredients in a stew. Such a situation is not 
dynamically complex (Senge, 1990). On the other hand dynamic complexity refers to 
problems and situations in which cause and effect are subtle (Senge, 1990). In this 
complexity, Senge contends that the same actions have different effects both in the short 
and long term. Importantly, these effects are not obvious. Interventions that are obvious 
in nature do not necessarily produce obvious consequences. Of particular significance, 
reductionist approaches are not well equipped to deal with dynamic complexity (Senge, 
1990). 
The two methods of Senge and Weaver are particularly important for this study as they 
provide an understanding of the realm to which systems thinking is applicable. 
3.2.2 Systems thinking 
Systems thinking is considered as one of the major breakthroughs for understanding the 
complex world (Senge, 1990; McCarthy, 1996; Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; 
Cohen, 2001; Foster et al., 2001). An appropriate definition of systems thinking for this 
study is presented in Senge's (1990: 7) classic The Fifth Discipline: 
"Systems thinking is a conceptual framework, body of knowledge and tools that has been 
developed over the past fifty years, to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to 
change effectively." 
In simple terms, it denotes a way that helps one to view the complex world from a 
broader perspective, including patterns of changes, and events, rather than just the events 
(Senge, 1990; Larsen et al., 1996). This broad perspective enables one to see the real 
causes of problems and where to effectively address them (Walker, 2000). Senge (1990: 
73) asserts that systems thinking is premised on a shift of mind: 
.:. Seeing interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chain, and; 
.:. Seeing processes of change rather than snapshots. 
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The cornerstone of systems thinking lies in its ability to deal effectively with organised 
complexity as identified above. This ability allows one to observe the structures that 
underlie "middle-number" and dynamic problems (Senge, 1990; Larsen et al., 1996; Kay 
and Foster, 1999). For the purposes of this study, the definition of the term structure is 
borrowed from Senge (1990: 44): "systemic structure is concerned with the key 
interrelationships that influence behaviour over time,,3. These interrelationships exist 
among or between variables such as natural resources and population, and not between 
people (Senge, 1990). 
Systems thinking is primarily concerned with the study of objects as wholes (Larsen et 
al., 1996). It is essentially twofold in approach: firstly, it perceives an object as being 
composed of systems, and; secondly it perceives an object as a whole situated in a bigger 
system (Larsen et al., 1996). As such, it assists one to see how wholes and their 
environment give rise to emergent problems (Kay and Foster, 1999). Importantly, it is 
concerned with how wholes are made up of processes and structures. These processes and 
structures are examined in terms of inputs, outputs, transformations and interconnections 
between the constituents that make up the system (Kay and Foster, 1999). 
It is important to note that a system cannot be understood as a function of its isolated 
components (Kay and Foster, 1999). Its behaviour is contingent on the interactions of its 
components as well as its context within a larger system (Kay and Foster, 1999). As such, 
to understand a system we need to understand how it fits into the larger system of which 
it is a part. In other words, we need to perceive a system as a component of another 
system, and is itself made up of sub-systems (yValker, 2000). 
3.2.3 Community 
The definition of the concept community is more often than not expressed implicitly in 
different approaches to CBNRM (Barrow and Murphree, 1998). In this study, it refers to 
spatial, social, cultural and economic terms (lIED, 1994). Spatially, it signifies 
"groupings of people who physically live in the same place." Socio-culturally, it refers to 
3 This definition does not apply to the "logical structure" as in argument development, or the "reporting 
structure" associated with organisations (Senge, 1990). 
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"social groupmgs that derive a unity from common history and cultural heritage, 
frequently based on kinship." Economically, the concept denotes "groupings of people 
who share interests and control over particular resources" (lIED, 1994: 4). In some other 
cases the concept is taken to mean social units where individuals speak and decide for 
themselves (Kiss, 1990). These social units represent the lower units of social 
organisation that mainly involve traditional authorities and the grassroots level (Kiss, 
1990). 
These defmitions merely attempt to present some of the approaches that have been used 
by different social actors according to their particular needs and conditions. However, it 
is cardinal that any attempts aimed at defming a particular local community and its 
boundaries should first and foremost recognise that local communities are characterised 
by high variability in both time and space (Uphoff, 1999). Importantly, they have shown 
to be dYnamic and internally differentiated, and the priorities and needs of individual 
persons are highly contested (lIED, 1994; Uphoff, 1999). 
3.2.4 Environmental management 
In order to effectively defme the term environmental governance, it is prudent to first 
analyse the two concepts from which the term is derived: environmental management and 
governance. According to Mugabe and Tumushabe (1999), the concept of environmental 
management has been fairly well defmed by several academicians and practitioners, more 
so than governance. It is therefore better understood than the term governance. For the 
purposes of this study, environmental management is defined as ''the implementation of 
measures either to [promote] balanced utilisation of the natural environment so as to 
prevent over exploitation, or to prevent the introduction of any substances which might 
immediately or in the long term have deleterious consequences on the environment" 
(Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999: 12). There are basically two reasons why people engage 
in environmental management (Murphree, 1993). Firstly, people assume that the human 
standards of living can be fostered through environmental management (Murphree, 
1993). Secondly, people assume that the effects of environmental degradation threaten 
life-support systems and the aesthetic values of people (Murphree, 1993). 
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3.2.5 Governance 
The concept of governance IS subject to different interpretations. Silitshena and 
Masacorale (1999) base their notion of governance on social, cultural, economic and 
political perspectives. They defme governance as embracing "complex, inter-linked and 
superimposed notions of social, cultural, economic and political processes which 
combine in such a way as to highlight state responsiveness and accountability, and the 
impact of these on political stability and economic development" (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999: 197). However, their focus is on the process of responsiveness of 
governments to the needs of civil society. This process is characterised by checks and 
balances, which ensure that a government is accountable to civil society. 
The UNDP (1997) defines governance as the "exercise of political, economIC and 
administrative authority to manage a society's affairs." This definition implies that 
governance can be basically approached from three main perspectives. Firstly, political 
governance that refers to exercising political authority and involves formulating policies 
through decision-making processes (UNDP, 1997). Secondly, economic governance that 
refers to exercising economic authority and involves decision-making processes that 
affect the economic activities of a country (UNDP, 1997). Thirdly, administrative 
governance that refers to exercising administrative authority, and basically involves 
administering policies (UNDP, 1997). 
At times the term governance is used interchangeably with the term government (UNDP, 
1999). The UNDP, in its training module slides, takes governance to mean government. It 
subsequently defmes government as "a system of policy decision-making processes, 
institutional structures and rules (formal and informal) for articulating, resolving and 
acting upon issues of the public." Thus, governance is seen as a process that guides social 
actors concerning "how norms are established, how power is exercised, and how citizens 
have their say" (UNDP, 1997: 5). 
The above definitions of governance, however, embrace dictatorships as well as 
democracies. This is more the reason why the meaning of governance is usually 
conceptually conveyed in most literature as having undertones that intrinsically refer to 
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"effective governance" (see for example, Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999; Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999; UNDP, 1999). These undertones are seen as the organising principles 
that structure the relationships between state and civil society. These principles include 
legitimacy, participation, consensus, fairness and accountability (UNDP, 1994; Silitshena 
and Masacorale, 1999; UNDP, 1999). The principles underpin processes that "restrain 
governors from behaving in a manner that injures the interests of the governed" (Mugabe 
and Tumushabe, 1999: 14). This ensures that the governors become more responsive to 
the needs of the governed. 
At times effective governance is regarded as synonymous with democracy. For example, 
the UNDP (1999) describes effective governance as a process that denotes democracy. 
Accordingly, it conceives governance as signifying a process that engages a wide range 
of stakeholders, other than just state agencies, in policy formulation and implementation. 
This approach is essentially concerned with the capacities of civil society and the private 
sector in managing the affairs of a nation (UNDP, 1999). The central idea in this 
approach is the need for governments to share governance responsibilities with civil 
society and the private sector. 
Although state-civil society relationships are the focus of most scholars' and 
practitioners' analyses of governance, it is now generally recognised that the process of 
governance is broad and goes beyond the political power exercised by a government 
(UNDP, 1997; Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). To this effect, the UNDP (1997: 3) 
expands its definition of governance by stating that "governance comprises the 
mechanisms, processes and institutions through which collective decisions are made and 
implemented, citizens, groups and communities pursue their visions, articulate their 
interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences." 
This definition goes beyond the normal state-civil society relationships that are implicit in 
most definitions. It emphasises the interactions amongst social actors, of which 
government is just part (UNDP, 1997). 
In this study, a broad definition of governance is adopted. Accordingly, it is defined as 
''the conscious management of regime structures [and processes] to strengthen the 
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legitimacy of the public realm" (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999: 34). The public realm in this 
definition denotes the arena in which social actors interact to make authoritative decisions 
(Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). This is very important for the conceptual framework of this 
study as it points to the fact that governance does not mean that political power is only 
vested in the formal legal state institutions (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Importantly, it 
points to the fact that governance does not mean that political control is only vested in the 
head of state. This approach is necessary especially for African conditions, where both 
informal and unofficial regimes exist (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Thus, establishing a 
link between governance and regime is central to this conceptual framework. 
3.2.6 Regime 
In this study, a regime is a body of fundamental rules that systematises the social realm 
(Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). These rules provide the normative framework that guides the 
decisions and actions of social actors (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). They can be 
institutionalised at different levels of social interaction (global, regional, national and 
local) to establish particular regime processes and structures (Bonger, 1999) The 
management of these processes and structures, to strengthen the legitimacy of the public 
realm, is the essence of governance (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). It is therefore possible to 
study the regime processes and structures at the different interaction levels (Ponton and 
Gill, 1982; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). 
3.2.7 Environmental governance 
For the purposes of this study, environmental governance is defined as a process that 
guides or regulates the relationships amongst governors, the governed and other 
stakeholders (such as international and national environmental NGOs, pressure groups 
and national environmental agencies) in the management and utilisation of natural 
resources (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). This process is founded on values and norms 
that are expressed in a complex chain of rules and laws, and policies, goals and strategies 
that constitute organisational, administrative or project management mechanism (Mugabe 
and Tumushabe, 1999). Therefore, environmental governance provides a framework 
within which the relationships of social actors are guided and regulated (Bonger, 1999). 
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The term governor in this context includes all social actors having power to control 
decision-making processes (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Government is just one of the 
main social actors in these processes, which can be institutionalised at different levels 
(global, regional, national and local) to establish particular regime structures and 
processes. Regimes set out the borders of socio-political choices and goals, economic 
objectives and instruments and cultural values that are expressed in policies, laws and 
rules (Bonger, 1999; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). 
The above defInition illustrates the importance of environmental governance. More 
importantly, it illustrates two points why the linkage between environmental management 
and governance is central to this study. Firstly, the linkage is critical as it means that 
environmental issues are not primarily a preserve of government. The development and 
implementation of policies, laws and rules require collective decision-making in 
managing the use of natural resources. Thus, environmental governance regimes set out 
the different roles and responsibilities of governors, the governed and other stakeholders 
in the process of collective decision-making. 
Secondly, the linkage means that environmental management should not just be restricted 
to technical concerns, but should encompass socio-political, economic and cultural issues 
and concerns. This approach brings out critical socio-political questions about power 
relations and intra- and inter-generational equity issues. It also brings to the surface the 
motivational dynamics that are entrenched in economic systems. Cultural values also 
clearly emerge through this approach as intellectual expressions of society. 
3.3 Rationale for the conceptual framework 
From the onset, it is important to provide some understanding as to what a mental model 
is. This is because the conceptual framework of this study is founded on a mental model 
(Figure 3.2). Gentner and Stevens (1983) defme it as a basic theory for understanding 
how people think about the world. They explicate that it is based on cognitive views that 
we use to try and make sense of how the world works. This defmition underpins the 
observations of Senge (1990: 8) who elucidates that mental models are "deeply ingrained 
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assumptions, generalisations, or even pictures or images that influence how we 
understand the world and we take action." 
According to Gentner and Stevens (1983: 12), "in interacting with the environment, with 
others, and with the artefacts of technology, people form internal, mental models of 
themselves and of the things with which they are interacting." For this reason, mental 
models should be construed as representations of reality that correspond to significant 
aspects of our physical and social systems (Gentner and Stevens, 1983). We construct 
and use them to understand specific phenomena. Larsen et al. (1996) argue that we 
manipulate elements of these models each time we think, plan, and try to explain events 
of the world. As such, they influence human responses to new situations (Larsen et al., 
1996). However, it is cardinal to be mindful that mental models are always incomplete 
and constantly evolving as we interact with particular systems (Gentner and Stevens, 
1983). 
Based on the foregoing and building on the overview of the trends in biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable development in chapter 1, this study constructed a mental 
model of a socio-biophysical system (Figure 3.2). The model is a representation of 
human and biophysical entities interacting as complex systems (McCarthy, 1996). The 
socio-biophysical system consists of three major components (sub-systems): social, 
management and biophysical systems. As a complex system, it cannot be understood as a 
function of its isolated components (Kay and Foster, 1999). Its components are complex 
interconnected systems that are in constant interaction. 
As depicted in Figure 3.2, social systems are made up of components such as socio-
politics, economies, and cultures (Kay, 2001). They interact with biophysical systems 
through flows of energy, matter and information (Cohen, 2001; Foster et al., 2001). 
Biophysical systems are made up of biotic and abiotic elements and processes (Kay and 
Foster, 1999). These elements and processes sustain the ecological integrity of these 
systems (Cohen, 2001). Management systems consist of goals, strategies, procedures, 
organisational mechanisms arid management resources (Smit and de Cronje, 1997). 
According to McCarthy (1996), they exist along the boundary between two complex 
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systems: social and biophysical systems. Basically, they are an expression of human 

















Figure 3.2 A mental model of a socio-hiophysical system depicting its components and their 
interrelationships (Source: McCarthy, 1996; Kay and Foster, 1999; Kay, 2001). 
Essentially, CBNRM schemes are management systems that promote community 
participation in natural resource management by giving rural local communities an 
effective say over the use of natural resources (ART, 1999). Being management systems, 
they should be seen as part of a larger socio-biophysical system (McCarthy, 1996). They 
exist along the boundary between complex social and biophysical systems (McCarthy, 
1996). The context of the biophysical system may be a source of external stimuli with the 
capacity to trigger major system changes in CBNRM systems (Foster et aI., 2001). As 
such, CBNRM systems should be construed as complex systems that exhibit organised 
complexity, with intermediate number of interactions among variables (Kay, 2001). 
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Accordingly, they generate "middle-number" and dynamic problems, which are a 
purview of systems thinking, and not reductionist approaches (Senge, 1990; Foster et ai., 
2001). 
The perspective of CBNRM systems as complex systems provides this study with a more 
complete understanding of the dynamics that underlie their structures and processes. This 
has vital implications for CBNRM studies. One such implication is that CBNRM systems 
should be studied as wholes made up of processes and structures (Larsen et ai., 1996). 
These processes and structures should be examined in terms of inputs, outputs, 
transformations and interconnections between the components that make up CBNRM 
systems (Larsen et ai., 1996). To understand these components we need to understand 
how a particular CBNRM system fits into the larger system of which it is a part (yV alker, 
2000). In other words, we need to perceive a CBNRM system as a component of another 
system, and is itself made up of sub-systems (yValker, 2000). 
From the foregoing, three types of factors that exert influence over the effectiveness of 
CBNRM in contributing to sustainable development can be identified: social, 
management and environmental factors (Esman and Uphoff, 1984; McCarthy, 1996; 
Hyden and Mugabe, 1999; Lyons, 1999; Uphoff, 1999;). Governance factors exert 
influence over the success or failure of CBNRM through socio-political, economic and 
cultural variables (McCarthy, 1996). Management factors exert influence through 
variables such as goals, strategies, procedures, organisational mechanisms and 
management resources (McCarthy, 1996). Environmentalfactors exert influence through 
variables such as the availability of natural resources and assimilation capacity of the 
biophysical environment (McCarthy, 1996). 
The three types of factors do not exist in isolation, but are interconnected and influencing 
and being influenced by each other (Smit and de Cronje, 1997; Hyden and Mugabe, 
1999; Uphoff, 1999; Breen, pers. com. 4). Therefore, any attempts aimed at analysing 
4 Professor C. Breen supervised this study and operates from the Centre for Environment and Development 
at University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 
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CBNRM need to be maintained within conceptions that comprehend their 
interconnectedness (Kay, 2001). This understanding justifies a strong concern for the 
development of a systems-based intellectual tool for analysing CBNRM (McCarthy, 
1996). By applying such a tool, this study expects the critical governance, management 
and environmental issues and concerns to clearly emerge. 
For a long time, the development and application of systems-based tools have focused on 
manipulating mathematical models to generate solutions to given problems (Foster et ai., 
2001). Recently the focus has shifted to developing systems-based intellectual tools that 
facilitate a systemic framing of problem situations under conditions of irreducible 
complexity (Foster et ai. , 2001). An example of such a tool is a conceptual framework 
(McCarthy, 1996; Cohen, 2001; Foster et ai. , 2001; Kay, 2001). For the purposes of this 
study, it is defmed as a coherent theory that explains why a particular system is in the 
state it is, and describes the factors affecting the system (Lyons, 1999). It can be used to 
identify where CBNRM systems can be expected to have the greatest effect and how 
necessary changes can be made (Lyons, 1999). Therefore, conceptual frameworks can be 
construed as the fundamental building blocks of CBNRM (Lyons, 1999; Foster et ai., 
2001). The effectiveness of these systems can more often than not be linked to the 
validity of the conceptual frameworks upon which they are based (McCarthy, 1996; 
Lyons, 1999). Generally, many of their failures can be directly traced to incomplete 
conceptual frameworks, and more specifically to the assumptions guiding their 
constructions (Lyons, 1999). 
This understanding necessitates the construction of an holistic conceptual framework for 
systemically analysing CBNRM systems, more especially because these systems operate 
within the realm of organised complexity (Kay, 2001). Such a framework should 
encompass governance, management and environmental concepts and principles. 
Importantly, it should not be merely restricted to reductionist approaches. Consequently, 
in order to have an appropriate and functional conceptual framework, this study 
postulated that it requires positioning environmental governance as the core variable in 
such a framework. This is because environmental governance, as an holistic and distinct 
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heuristic variable, can be used to incorporate governance, management and 
environmental issues and concerns in CBNRM analyses and operations. 
However, it is surprising that little is known about the complex interrelationships 
between environmental governance and CBNRM. Although several studies have 
addressed the human dimensions of CBNRM, relatively little research has examined the 
critical role governance plays in these systems (Kiss, 1990; Berger, 1993; lIED, 1994; 
Steiner and Rihoy, 1995; ODA, 1996; Dimbi, 1998; IUCN, 1998; Maughan-Brown, 
1998; ART, 1999; Namanha, 1999; Abacar, 2000). 
A review of the literature on CBNRM revealed that a number of attempts have been 
made to construct conceptual frameworks for analysing CBNRM (lIED, 1994; Murphree, 
1996; Barrow and Murphree, 1998; Dimbi, 1998; Maughan-Brown, 1998; ART, 1999; 
Namanha, 1999; Abacar, 2000). These analytic frameworks reveal fundamental 
differences of intent and emphasis. Critical to this study, however, is that they employ 
reductionist variables that do not explicitly incorporate the fundamental principles of 
environmental governance. Where attempts have been made to include these principles, 
they have more often than not appeared as conditionalities intended to satisfy 
international donor demands, and rarely have they been used as an approach for 
improving the performance or output of CBNRM (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999; Lyons, 
1999; Uphoff, 1999). 
The lIED (1994), for example, developed a conceptual framework for analysing 
CBNRM, which is based on the notion of participation. In this framework, participation 
forms the basis for analysing CBNRM. Accordingly, participation is organised in four 
main categories: top-down, passive participation, towards active participation and 
community lead (lIED, 1994). Such an approach does not, however, address the problems 
of democratic participation in decision-making, which are evident in most CBNRM 
systems. For example, although most governments in southern Africa have embraced the 
concept of participation, this has essentially turned out to ''mean the co-option of local 
elites and leadership for derived programmes" (Murphree, 1994: 405). This has resulted 
in autocratic decision-making and generally a lack of accountability and transparency, 
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which are essential elements of effective environmental governance systems. 
Consequently, the dream of achieving democratic participation at the local community 
levels in most CBNRM systems has been elusive. 
Another example is derived from the IUCN conceptual framework for CBNRM (Barrow 
and Murphree, 1998). In this framework, the IUCN bases its analysis of these systems on 
the concept of collaboration. Accordingly, different forms of collaboration between local 
communities and conservation authorities are developed. Collaboration is seen from the 
perspective of joint agreements between local communities on one hand, and 
conservation authorities on the other hand, which actually own the concerned natural 
resources (Barrow and Murphree, 1998). Although this framework might appear to have 
implicitly addressed the fundamental environmental governance issues and concerns, the 
environmental governance concepts and principles upon which it is based are far less 
developed than the others. Importantly, the framework does not address the issues and 
concerns of cooperative environmental governance, which are central to effective 
environmental governance. For example, although the framework addresses the need for 
collaboration between local communities and conservation authorities, critical questions 
still remain concerning the practicability of enforcing the resultant joint agreements, and 
the efficacy of the framework to bring out the desired degrees of cooperation. Does it 
foster equal and stable partnerships amongst different social actors? Does it enhance the 
capacity of all social partners to engage in effective environmental governance? Does it 
enhance the commitment of all social partners to desired goals? 
The conceptual framework of Dimbi (1998) derives its analytic strengths from the narrow 
concept of leadership. This concept is used in analysing a case study of the Communal 
Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. In 
the analysis, the costs and benefits involved in leadership are given great attention. 
However, this conceptual framework does not take into consideration the fact that many 
changes in natural resource status are not necessarily an end result of the quality of 
leadership. Importantly, it does not appreciate the fact that the quality of leadership is 
largely determined by the environmental governance values and norms that guide and 
regulate the relationships amongst social actors (for example see Hyden and Mugabe, 
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1999i. It does not also consider that the manner in which natural resources are viewed 
and used is largely conditioned by the nature and quality of the relationships embodied in 
CBNRM partnerships, and not the nature and quality of leadership. 
Clearly, the above conceptual frameworks do not explicitly address the concept of 
environmental governance. Essentially, the variables on which they are based are 
reductionist in approach. Accordingly, their efficacy in analysing CBNRM ultimately 
hinges on the nature and effectiveness of the environmental governance framework, 
which actually houses them. 
It was within this motivational context that the conceptual framework of this study was 
constructed for analysing CBNRM. Significantly, this framework has an holistic core 
variable: environmental governance. By systemically applying it to CBNRM, the critical 
governance, management and environmental issues and concerns that are entrenched in 
environmental governance systems can clearly emerge. 
3.4 A Conceptual framework based on effective CBEG 
The purpose of this section is to construct a conceptual framework based on effective 
community-based environmental governance (CBEG) for analysing CBNRM. From the 
foregoing and building on existing literature on environmental governance, CBEG is 
conceptualised as a process that guides and regulates the relationships amongst social 
actors in community-based systems in the management and utilisation of natural 
resources (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999; Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). This 
process is founded on governance values and nonns that are expressed through infonnal 
and formal rules and laws, and management goals, strategies and procedures (Mugabe 
and Tumushabe, 1999). These do not exist in isolation, but are interconnected (Mugabe 
and Tumushabe, 1999). Through their interconnectedness, they conspire to produce 
specific CBEG regimes (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). 
Figure 3.3 depicts a conceptual framework based on effective CBEG. The properties of 
effective CBEG are epitomised in the legitimate relationships embodied in CBEG 
5 It should be noted that leadership can also influence environmental norms and values (Breen, pers. com.). 
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processes (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). From a socio-political perspective, the term 
legitimacy denotes the degree of acceptance that a CBEG regime enjoys amongst social 
actors (Ponton and Gill, 1982). It is primarily concerned with the nature and quality of 
relationships amongst social actors (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). However, this is not 
simply a matter of attitudes but of behaviour, which resolves itself into a question of the 
nature and degree of commitment provided by social actors to a particular CBEG 
(Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). The nature and degree of commitment is determined by 
the nature and quality of relationships embodied in CBEG, or vice verse (Ponton and 
Gill, 1982; Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). Thus, reciprocal behaviour and legitimate 
relationships amongst social actors characterise effective CBEG (Ponton and Gill, 1982; 
Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999; Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). 
Therefore, social actors take appropriate measures to preserve and enhance legitimacy by 
capitalising on the positive attributes of legitimacy (ponton and Gill, 1982). The positive 
attributes include the manifestations of committed support for a CBEG regime (Ponton 
and Gill, 1982). The negative attributes include the manifestations of conflicts, 
unlawfulness, non-compliance and dissatisfactions (ponton and Gill, 1982). These 
manifestations signify a lack of committed support for a CBEG regime. The conscious 
management of these attributes to strengthen the legitimacy of a particular CBEG regime 
is the essence of effective CBEG (Ponton and Gill, 1982). 
Effective CBEG is an arena in which social actors interact to make collective, 
authoritative decisions and to take actions that are relevant and acceptable to all 
interested and affected parties (Si1itshena and Masacorale, 1999). For the purposes of this 
conceptual framework, legitimate relationships in effective CBEG are expressed through 
CBNRM partnerships consisting of two main social actors: government and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Figure 3.3). The criteria for designating CBNRM 
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Figure 3.3 A conceptual framework based on effective CBEG. 
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Firstly, CBEG is a distinct social arena in which different social actors interact to 
generate collective, authoritative decisions and to take actions (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). Therefore, CBEG authorities and responsibilities are not a preserve of 
governmental institutions, and thus should be innovatively shared amongst all social 
actors (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). Secondly, the conditions that favour purely 
autonomous 'community' NRM systems are presently more restricted, and thus require 
the involvement and support of all social actors (ART, 1999; Uphoff, 1999). 
Through CBNRM partnerships, social actors design, establish and implement CBNRM 
systems (ART, 1999). The effective management of these partnerships is presently one of 
the main challenges facing most CBNRM systems in southern Africa (ART, 1999). 
Notably, efforts aimed at bringing about the desired cooperation amongst social actors in 
these partnerships have been problematic (ART, 1999; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999; 
Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999; Uphoff, 1999). 
3.5 CBNRM Partnership 
This conceptual framework postulated that the effective management of CBNRM 
partnerships to a large extent depends on the principles of cooperative environmental 
governance (Figure 3.3). Cooperative environmental governance is a form of governance 
that promotes and establishes cooperative partnerships, rather than prescriptive and 
coercive ones (May, et a/., 1996). Social actors, who are herein referred to as cooperating 
partners, in cooperative partnerships are expected to apply the principles of cooperative 
environmental governance (May, et a/., 1996). The nature and quality of the partnerships 
established by cooperating partners through these principles are central to effective 
CBEG. 
To strengthen legitimacy, the relationships in cooperative partnerships are essentially 
reciprocal (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). The reciprocity that exists in these 
relationships establishes a two-way flow of relations amongst social actors (governments 
and NGOs) (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). This implies that cooperating partners 
support and depend on each other in their quest to achieve the goals they share (May, et 
a/., 1996; Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). Accordingly, their behaviour is continually 
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checked and balanced by the cooperating partners amongst themselves (Mugabe and 
Tumushabe, 1999). 
For the purposes of this study, effective CBNRM partnerships are founded on the five 
properties of cooperative partnerships (May, et al. , 1996). These are: accountability, 
transparency, participation, shared governance and support for effective CBEG. Figure 
3.3 illustrates the relationships among these properties that are not necessarily sequential. 
Each property is interconnected with and influenced by the others, thereby establishing a 
continual feedback and dependency relationship among the properties (May, et ai., 1996). 
Arising from this interconnectedness is a subtle underlying structure that influences the 
behaviour of cooperating partners (see Senge, 1990). This underlying structure influences 
"individual actions and creates the conditions where types of events become likely" 
(Senge, 1990: 43). 
Using Senge's (1990) method of classifying complex problems, one would state that 
developing a constructive blend of these properties is a dynamic problem and essentially 
the challenge of CBNRM partnerships. As such, the properties should be systemically 
developed as an ensemble. In so doing, they can provide the necessary checks and 
balances for ensuring that the interests and rights of all partners are safeguarded (May, et 
al., 1996). By upholding these properties, CBNRM partnerships are expected to enhance 
the commitment of all partners (May, et al. , 1996). Thus, the properties are important in 
assessing the effectiveness of particular CBNRM partnerships. 
3.5.1 Accountability 
For the purposes of this conceptual framework, accountability refers to measures that 
compel the cooperating partners to account for the manner in which they performed every 
function for which they are responsible (OECD, 1998). In this way, the different 
cooperating partners can determine whether their interests and rights were in fact 
safeguarded (OECD, 1998). Although accountability differs and depends on the type of 
CBNRM partnership, and whether the decisions are internal or external to the 
partnership, it should not just be a matter of being answerable, implying that the 
cooperating partners merely justify what was done or not done (Crook and Manor, 1998). 
40 
Ideally, accountability should be enforced by purposeful control, punishment for 
wrongdoing, and compensation for the persons or parties prejudiced by the wrongdoing 
(Crook and Manor, 1998). This requires the authorities and responsibilities6 within 
CBNRM partnerships to be clearly defmed so as to align the interests and rights of the 
different cooperating partners (Crook and Manor, 1998; OECD, 1998). 
Cooperating partners can foster accountability by establishing clear lines of authorities 
and responsibilities for a CBNRM partnership (Smit and de Cronje, 1997; OECD, 1998). 
These lines are essential for maintaining the chain and unity of command within a 
partnership (Smit and de Cronje, 1997). The former refers to the hierarchy that develops 
by systemically arranging the positions and jobs in an organisational structure, whilst the 
later means that a subordinate has only one superior to whom he or she reports, thereby 
clarifying areas of responsibility and who is responsible to whom (Smit and de Cronje, 
1997). Once the lines of authorities and responsibilities have been clearly established, the 
units/persons responsible for exercising them should be clearly identified (OECD, 1998). 
However, the assignment of authorities and responsibilities does not suggest that 
accountability in itself has been enhanced. Certain conditions must be established before 
responsibilities are assigned to a unit or person. 
Firstly, the resources (financial, human, physical and information) required to accomplish 
the goals must be established and made available to those responsible (Smit and de 
Cronje, 1997). Secondly, the authorities required to deploy these resources must be 
assigned together with the responsibilities (Smit and de Cronje, 1997). Importantly, the 
authorities and responsibilities must be linked; otherwise, when they are de-linked and/or 
assigned to different entities both are eroded (Murphree, 1994; Smit and de Cronje, 
1997). Thirdly, the unit/person must accept and acknowledge both the authorities and 
responsibilities (Smit and de Cronje, 1997). It is only when these conditions are 
established that accountability can be effectively enhanced. 
6 Authority in this study refers to the right to make decisions and take appropriate actions, whilst 
responsibility refers to specific obligations or commitments on one's part to carry out a task in accordance 
with the instructions received (Smit and de Cronje, 1997). 
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3.5.2 Transparency 
Transparency is a concept that is essentially built on the free flow of infonnation (OECD, 
1998). This concept is central to effective CBEG because cooperating partners cannot be 
held accountable if there is no free flow ofinfonnation (OECD, 1998). It requires timely 
disclosure of infonnation concerning the perfonnance, processes and institutions of 
CBNRM partnerships (OECD, 1998). This infonnation should be directly accessible to 
those concerned with it (Crook and Manor, 1998; OECD, 1998). To enhance the free 
flow of infonnation, cooperating partners should establish clear internal and external 
channels of communication for a CBNRM partnership (OECD, 1998). This requires the 
establishment of clear reporting lines amongst individuals and groups within and outside 
an organisational structure (Smit and de Cronje, 1997). 
Ideally, transparency should be based on three main principles (OECD, 1998). Firstly, 
transparency should involve the disclosure of infonnation to all cooperating partners 
(OECD, 1998). To be of value, the infonnation should be accurate and timely (OECD, 
1998). Secondly, transparency should include the free access to the official documents of 
CBNRM partnerships by all cooperating partners (Crook and Manor, 1998; OECD, 
1998). Efforts should be made to present the infonnation in the documents in a language 
that is plain and understood (OECD, 1998). Thirdly, transparency should involve the free 
access by all cooperating partners to the meetings of CBNRM partnerships (OECD, 
1998). 
3.5.3 Participation 
Participation is defmed as a process in which cooperating partners are involved in making 
decisions that affect their lives (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). The interests and rights 
of cooperating partners can be safeguarded through their participation in the decision-
making processes of CBNRM partnerships (lIED, 1994; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). By 
so doing, the resultant decisions can be recognised and accepted by all cooperating 
partners (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Therefore, CBNRM partnerships should establish 
processes and features that promote the effective representation of cooperating partners in 
decision-making processes (Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Their participation should be 
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incorporated into either a decision-making or advisory capacity (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). 
To enhance participation, CBNRM partnerships should have features that promote 
effective participation in decision-making processes at all levels. For example, it is 
important for the majority of ordinary local community members to be allowed and 
encouraged to democratically participate (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). This can 
either be through direct participation where they engage in decision-making processes 
directly, or indirect participation where they engage in decision-making processes 
indirectly through elected representatives (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). In this way, 
the prospects of having the views and interests of local community members represented 
in particular CBNRM partnership can be greatly enhanced (Silitshena and Masacorale, 
1999). This can in turn motivate them to support CBNRM partnerships by, for example, 
complying with relevant environmental laws, which is cardinal for promoting the 
effective implementation of CBNRM planned activities (lIED, 1994; Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). 
3.5.4 Shared governance 
In simple terms, the concept of shared governance denotes the sharing of environmental 
governance authorities and responsibilities by cooperating partners (May, et aZ., 1996). 
This is based on the understanding that CBEG is not a preserve of one cooperating 
partner (May, et aZ., 1996). As such, the accompanying authorities and responsibilities 
have to be innovatively shared amongst all partners (May, et aZ., 1996; Hyden and 
Mugabe, 1999). For this reason, all the partners in cooperative partnerships engage in 
innovative sharing of environmental governance authorities and responsibilities (May, et 
aZ., 1996). 
In this study, governments are expected to be catalytic forces for creating an enabling 
environment for sharing environmental governance authorities and responsibilities with 
NGOs (lIED, 1994; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). NGOs act as constructive partners with 
governments in seeking and establishing appropriate means to attain the goals they share 
(Hyden and Mugabe, 1999) (Figure 3.3). Governments do not coercively prescribe the 
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specific means of achieving the goals, rather they may recommend the planning or 
process elements to be followed and a consensus is sought (May, et al., 1996). Thus, 
governments allow and encourage NGOs to play their partnership roles responsibly and 
constructively in effective CBNRM partnerships (May, et al., 1996). 
3.5.5 Support for effective CBEG 
Under cooperative partnerships, all partners provide support for effective CBEG (May, et 
al., 1996). Significantly, they do not consider and interpret effective CBEG as a one-off 
event, but an ongoing process requiring continuous investment of effort, adaptation and 
adjustment (Mug abe and Tumushabe, 1999). This requires cooperating partners to be 
process-oriented in their approach to effective CBEG (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). 
They thus provide appropriate resources and time frames for reorienting attitudes and 
behaviour through trust building and interactive dialogue, rather than coercive methods 
(liED, 1994; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Accordingly, trust building and interactive 
dialogue are key prerequisites for cooperative partnerships (OECD, 1998; Hyden and 
Mugabe,1999). 
Furthermore, the partners under cooperative partnerships continually adapt to the 
circumstances and time frames of particular CBEG regimes to produce real benefits for 
all cooperating partners (liED, 1994; May, et al., 1996). Importantly, they all provide for 
committed support to effective CBEG. Therefore, the financial and technical support 
resources that are available under these partnerships are ideally used for three important 
purposes: enticing others to join the partnerships; soliciting the support of all cooperating 
partners to effective CBEG; and enhancing their capacity to continually improve 
performance (liED, 1994; May, et al., 1996; ART, 1999). 
The effectiveness of CBNRM partnerships to an extent also depends on the support 
provided by key stakeholders such as ordinary local community members (Murphree, 
1994; ART, 1999). In southern Africa, the support provided by ordinary local community 
members is largely in the form of compliance with relevant environmental rules and laws 
(liED, 1994; ART, 1999). However, these stakeholders can only effectively comply 
depending on the type and qUality/quantity of incentives provided by CBNRM 
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partnerships (Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999; Gibson, 1999). For the purposes of this study, 
an incentive is something that attracts or repels ordinary local community members and 
leads them to modify their behaviour in some way (Field, 1994). Therefore, incentives 
are a necessary inducement to make these stakeholders comply with environmental rules 
and laws (lIED, 1994). Some may argue that tangible economic benefits are the most 
effective incentives (lIED, 1994; Dimbi, 1998). However, incentives of whatever kind 
should outweigh the costs of complying, (Murphree, 1994). Some of these costs may not 
even be of a monetary nature (Breen, pers. com.) 7• 
The above properties of cooperative partnerships can be used as an approach for 
overcoming the limitations of prescriptive and coercive CBNRM partnerships. However, 
to bring about the desired cooperation amongst cooperating partners requires an 
understanding of the different roles they play in CBEG (ART, 1999). For the purposes of 
this study, roles are broadly defmed as "bundles of rights, duties, obligations and 
expectations that guide the characteristic conduct of [cooperating partners] assuming such 
roles in a social system" (Knoke, 1990: 7). 
Therefore, to understand the different roles played by the cooperating partners requires an 
understanding of the relationships between the different roles (Knoke, 1990). 
Importantly, roles do not merely denote a set of appropriate activities undertaken by a 
cooperating partner, but indicate how the cooperating partner is expected to interact with 
other role players (Knoke, 1990). Every social role substantively exists in relation to the 
other roles with which it regularly interacts (Knoke, 1990). Thus, this conceptual 
framework identifies and describes the roles played by governments and NGOs in 
effective CBEG (Figure 3.3). These roles are important in analysing the effectiveness of 
CBNRM partnerships. 
3.6 Role of governments in CBEG 
As earlier stated, the environmental governance authorities and responsibilities under 
cooperative partnerships are not necessarily a preserve of government (May, et al., 1996). 
Therefore, the development and implementation of policies, laws and rules require 
7 See footnote 2 page 16. 
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collective decision-making in the management and utilisation of natural resources (May, 
et al., 1996). This suggests that governments will continue to play a significant role in 
CBEG, but this role needs to be redefmed to suit the principles of cooperative 
environmental governance (May, et al., 1996; Hyden and Mugabe, 1999). Accordingly, 
for the purposes of this conceptual framework, governments play two important roles in 
CBEG. These are establishing regulatory frameworks and providing extension services 
(ART, 1999) (Figure 3.3). This conceptual framework expects governments to operate 
within the principles of cooperative environmental governance when executing these 
roles. 
3.6.1 Establishing regulatory frameworks 
One of the most important roles that governments can play in effective CBEG is to 
establish regulatory frameworks (Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999). In the process of 
establishing regulatory frameworks, governments should be enabling partners by 
allowing and encouraging other cooperating partners to effectively participate in and 
contribute to the process (May, et al., 1996). Importantly, governments should promote 
and establish the effective representation of all cooperating partners in this process, 
especially ordinary local community members whose support CBNRM partnerships so 
much require (May, et al., 1996). 
As enabling partners, governments should ideally set out general regulatory frameworks 
within which all cooperating partners can arrange their interests and activities (ART, 
1999). These frameworks should be flexible and not prescribe how cooperating partners 
are to achieve the desired outcomes (May, et al., 1996; ART, 1999). Thus, governments 
should merely set the boundaries of acceptable societal norms and standards for all 
cooperating partners, governments included (May, et al., 1996). Importantly, they should 
not establish blueprints and detailed guidelines within which cooperating partners are to 
operate (May, et al., 1996). 
Governments, in the process of establishing general regulatory frameworks, need to 
coordinate the various regulatory frameworks that impact on CBEG (May, et al., 1996; 
ART, 1999). The problem of ineffective coordination of different regulatory frameworks 
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by governments is a common feature in southern Africa (ART, 1999). This is largely 
attributed to the compartmentalisation of government departments, which are responsible 
for specific sectors such as fisheries, water and wildlife (ART, 1999). Each department 
implements and enforces its own set of policies and legislation specific to its sector 
(ART, 1999). Such an approach merely sends different messages to interested and 
affected parties, and is a major source of conflict amongst cooperating partners (ART, 
1999). Thus, governments need to coordinate the various regulatory frameworks by 
developing a common and shared CBEG philosophy for all social actors (May, et al., 
1996). 
3.6.2 Providing extension services 
The other important role that governments can play in effective CBEG is to provide 
extension services (Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999). Extension services are vital for the 
successful management of CBNRM partnerships. Through the provision of these 
services, governments can enhance the capacity of cooperating partners (ART, 1999). 
The extension services provided by governments will depend on a number of factors such 
as availability of resources and the political commitment of governments to promote 
effective CBEG (Murphree, 1994). Since CBEG involves the sharing of environmental 
governance authorities and responsibilities between governments and NGOs, most 
governments lack the political commitment to provide extension services that are in line 
with the principles of cooperative governance and the interests of NGOs (Murphree, 
1994; May, et a!., 1996; ART, 1999). This is partly because government officials fear 
that sharing environmental governance authority and responsibilities with NGOs may 
diminish their power and resources (Murphree, 1994). As a result, most governments are 
unwilling to align the services they provide with the interests of other cooperating 
partners (Murphree, 1994). 
However, governments must be fully committed to and supportive of effective CBEG 
and provide extension services so as to enhance the capacity of cooperating partners to 
perform (Murphree, 1994; May, et al., 1996). This will in turn enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness ofCBNRM (Murphree, 1994). However, evidence has also shown that most 
governments in southern Africa do not have the necessary knowledge and skills required 
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to provide quality extension services (Dimbi, 1998; Maughan-Brown, 1998; Namanha, 
1999; Abacar, 2000; Breen, pers. com. 8). Therefore, it might be necessary to provide the 
same 'services' to such governments to enhance their capacities. 
In this conceptual framework (Figure 3.3), the extension servIces provided by 
governments are categorised into the following: providing information, providing 
specialist personnel, training and education, facilitation, and research and monitoring. 
Providing information is one of the most important extension services in this conceptual 
framework. Generally, most cooperating partners in southern Africa lack information to 
make informed decisions (ART, 1999; Lyons, 1999). This is partly because of the 
inability of governments to provide sufficient information about the opportunities 
provided by CBNRM partnerships (Lyons, 1999). For example, the language contained in 
most policy and legislative documents tends to be too specialised for ordinary local 
community members (Murphree, 1994). As a result, most local community members lack 
information about how they can take advantage of the various opportunities offered by 
the partnerships (Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999). Such information gaps can be addressed 
by way of governments providing information about government policies and legislation 
in local languages (Lyons, 1999). By so doing, however, governments should endeavour 
as much as possible to provide information that is line with the interests of, and hence 
relevant for local communities (Murphree, 1994). 
Governments can provide specialist personnel as an extension service (Murphree, 1994; 
ART, 1999). According to Murphree (1994), the long colonial histories experienced by 
most developing countries have made most local communities dependent on external 
agents. As a result, their inability to plan and function effectively has been one of the 
greatest challenges facing CBNRM partnerships (Murphree, 1994). Governments can 
contribute in this respect by providing specialist personnel to assist local communities in 
their planning activities (Murphree, 1994). However, since governments' extension 
personnel tend to impose their own formulations, which are often not in line with local 
interests, it is important that measures be put in place to ensure that the services rendered 
are consistent with community circumstances and perspectives (Murphree, 1994). 
8 See footnote 2 page 16. 
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Governments can provide training and education as an extension service (Kiss, 1990). 
The development of effective CBEG requires considerable training and education (Kiss, 
1990). For example, the process of establishing CBOs requires training and education to 
develop the skills of local community members (ART, 1999). Thus, governments can 
contribute to this process by developing training and education programmes for local 
communities (ART, 1999). However, in developing local communities' skills, 
governments should ensure that relevant and adequate resources, policy and legislative 
frameworks are also made available (Kiss, 1990; Murphree, 1994). The tendency of most 
governments has been to provide prescriptive forms of skills development without 
providing the right resources, policy and legislation frameworks for local communities to 
perform (Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999). 
The development of effective CBEG reqUIres the servIces of facilitation, which 
governments can provide (Murphree, 1994; May, et al., 1996). For example, the process 
of establishing democratic CBOs is central to effective CBEG (ART, 1999). However, 
this process requires facilitation to promote the establishment of accountable and 
transparent CBOs (ART, 1999). The process can never be an easy challenge to meet as it 
implies developing democratic systems of decision-making (ART, 1999). Thus, 
governments can contribute to this process by providing facilitation services. 
Research and monitoring services could include a range of matters, including socio-
political, economic, cultural and biological studies (Kiss, 1990). Some of the research and 
monitoring services that governments can provide include ecological and biological 
studies to determine wildlife animal carrying capacities and sustainable off-takes (Kiss, 
1990). However, in determining sustainable off-takes, governments should endeavour to 
be flexible so as to incorporate the needs and aspirations of the other social actors within 
the bounds of sustainable use (Kiss, 1990). This calls for collective decision-making 
processes, which involve all cooperating partners (Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999). 
Governments can also provide wildlife research services by carrying out research to 
improve understanding and the efficiency of wildlife harvesting techniques, wildlife 
market analyses and wildlife meat processing (Kiss, 1990). Sociological studies could 
include applied research to investigate the impact of CBNRM schemes on the livelihood 
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patterns of local communities (Kiss, 1990). They could also include a stakeholder 
analysis within and outside local communities to identify the interests of different 
individuals and groups, and the changes in the interests of stakeholders (Kiss, 1990). 
Ideally, sociological studies should involve participatory planning and joint analysis 
(lIED, 1994). 
Governments should flrst and foremost provide extension services that are driven by the 
real needs of all cooperating partners (Murphree, 1994). Government offlcials should 
desist from providing extension services that only end up satisfying their personal goals 
and aspirations (Kiss, 1990, Murphree, 1994; ART, 1999). As such, extension services 
should be based on the substantive needs of all cooperating partners in CBEG (Murphree, 
1994). For example, the tendency in research services has been to restrict wildlife 
research to specialised topics in wildlife biology or ecology, which has prevented wildlife 
from being recognised as an alternative land use (Kiss, 1990). 
3.7 Role of NGOs in CBEG 
According to Doyle and McEachern (1998), NGOs are the most visible players in 
environmental governance and are found in all spheres of environmental governance 
(international, national, regional, local and community). As such, their role is central to 
effective CBEG (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). This section describes the role ofNGOs 
in effective CBEG. In this conceptual framework, NGOs are categorised into two main 
groupings: community-based organisations (CBOs) and support agencies (Figure 3.3f 
CBOs are defmed as non-governmental entities that provide services within a local 
community and are accountable at least in principle more directly to local community 
constituents (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). The role of CBOs in effective CBEG is to 
provide for community participation in CBEG. As implied in their title, donor support 
agencies have only one major role to play in effective CBEG: providing support services. 
9 Although the term non-governmental could include the commercial "private" sector, in this study, the 
acronym NGO does not apply to business organisations (see Doyle and McEachern, 1998). 
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3.7.1 Role of eBOs 
One of the fundamental prerequisites for the advancement of sustainable development is 
broad participation by local communities (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). In the specific context of CBEG, the need for new fonns of 
participation has emerged (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
These include the need of local communities to participate in decision-making processes, 
particularly those that potentially affect their livelihood patterns (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). Essentially, participation in decision-making by local communities is 
mainly fostered through the establishment of representative local organisations, which are 
capable of articulating the needs and aspirations of their constituents (Little, 1994). This 
is more the reason why CBOs in CBNRM schemes are established (ART, 1999). CBOs 
provide a powerful grassroots approach to effective CBEG and are effective at securing 
greater community participation in CBEG. Hence, the role for CBOs in this conceptual 
framework is to provide for community participation in CBEG (Figure 3.3). 
CBOs provide for community participation in CBEG through two main ways: direct 
participation and indirect participation (ponton and Gill, 1982; Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). Under direct participation, the majority of local community members 
engage directly in the decision-making processes of CBOs (Silitshena and Masacorale, 
1999). This can be through local community meetings, public consultations and direct 
contact between CBO officials and individuaVgroups (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). 
Under indirect participation, the majority of local community members engage indirectly 
in the decision-making processes of CBOs through elected representatives (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). The elected representatives represent the interests and rights of their 
constituents who cannot take part directly in the decision-making processes due in part to 
their big numbers (ponton and Gill, 1982). Thus, local community members elect 
representatives of their own choice who are expected to safeguard community interests 
and rights (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). 
Against this backdrop, providing for participation can be basically construed as a process 
in which collective decisions are made, as opposed to individual decisions (Crook and 
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Manor, 1998; Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). This process requires the majority of 
local community members to make collective decisions (Silitshena and Masacorale, 
1999). This entails providing for participation is essentially a democratic process in 
which popular control of decision-making is central, and not incidental (Silitshena and 
Masacorale, 1999). Consequently, the notion of popular control of decision-making is 
one of the main properties of effective CBEG. This property requires CBOs to promote 
popular control of collective decision-making and to establish democratic structures when 
providing for community participation in CBEG (Silitshena and Masacorale, 1999). 
3.7.2 Role of support agencies 
Support agencies are external to local communities and derive their resources from 
sources other than the natural resources of an area (Breen, pe;s. com.) 10. The term support 
agencies may include a whole range of organisations, which include national service 
NGOs, universities and research organisations, interest associations, consultancy 
agencies, international donor/aid NGOs (Murphree, 1993; Doyle and McEachern, 1998). 
For this conceptual framework, the term has been restricted to international donor support 
agencies, which mostly provide technical and fmancial support. These agencies are 
relevant to the case study addressed in this study. Thus, this sub-section considers the role 
of international donor support agencies in effective CBEG. 
International donor support agencies play an important role of providing support services 
for effective CBEG (ART, 1999; Bonger, 1999). These agencies may provide some of the 
support services provided by governments (see section 3.6.2 above). Although their role 
is similar to that of governments, international donor support agencies differ from 
governments in two main ways: focus and permanence (Murphree, 1993). In most cases, 
international donor agencies tend to focus their resources on specific issues or problems 
(Murphree, 1993). In other words, they are issue- or problem-specific in focus 
(Murphree, 1993). They are usually constituted as a result of perceived needs and may 
fall away when the needs (or their perceptions) change (Murphree, 1994; Bonger, 1999). 
On the other hand, governments respond to social requirements that are multiplex and 
10 See footnote 2 page 16. 
52 
long-tenn in nature (Murphree, 1994). Thus, they tend to have the character of 
pennanence (Murphree, 1994; Bonger, 1999). Because of being issue or problem-
specific, international donor support agencies have the capacity to mobilise technical and 
fmancial resources quicker and more efficiently than governments (Murphree, 1994). 
This is why international donor support agencies are the major fmancial conduits of 
global environmental governance (Murphree, 1994). As such, they are fmancially 
stronger than governments (Murphree, 1994). 
In southern Africa, most CBNRM partnerships are initiated through the fmancial support 
of international donor support agencies (Murphree, 1993; lIED, 1994; Maughan-Brown, 
1998; Namanha, 1999). The financial support nonnally continues into the operational 
phases of CBNRM systems, which usually leads to a situation where the systems become 
perpetually dependent on the fmancial support of international donor support agencies 
(Bonger, 1999). This situation is commonly referred to as the dependence syndrome 
(Kruiter, 1996). The dependence syndrome usually creates programme or project 
sustainability problems for CBNRM partnerships (for example see Maughan-Brown, 
1998; Namanha, 1999). The problems of sustainability worsen especially when 
international donor support agencies stop providing financial support (Bonger, 1999). As 
a result most CBNRM partnerships rarely survive beyond the point of the fmancial 
support provided by international donor support agencies (Bonger, 1999). 
To address the problem of dependence syndrome, this conceptual framework proposed 
two principles. The first principle states that CBNRM partnerships should avoid 
dependency syndromes by relying on locally generated resources for their sustainability 
(Kruiter, 1996). For example, cooperating partners can establish local income generating 
projects, whose revenue can be used to sustain these partnerships (Murphree, 1994). 
However, care should be taken to avoid establishing income-generating projects over 
which cooperating partners have little or no interest in maintaining (Murphree, 1994; 
Bonger, 1999). This principle does not completely rule out international donor support, 
but merely suggests committed support for effective CBEG by all cooperating partners 
(Murphree, 1994). For example, instead of being given as grants, donor funds can be used 
as soft loans for enhancing the commitment of all cooperating partners to effective CBEG 
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(Murphree, 1994). Such an approach can also be used as a tool for linking the 
commitment and performance of cooperating partners with the required donor support; 
thus establishing reciprocal relationships (lIED, 1994). 
It is a common approach in southern Africa to base intended outputs of CBNRM on the 
availability of funds provided by international donor support agencies (Bonger, 1999). In 
most cases, the continuing availability of funds merely reinforces the supply-side of the 
systems (Bonger, 1999). Thus, most CBNRM partnerships end up being supply driven 
(Bonger, 1999). Whilst this conceptual framework acknowledges the importance of 
fmancial resources to CBNRM partnerships, the supply driven approach does not take 
into account the actual needs of beneficiaries (both present and future) (Bonger, 1999). 
The intended outputs of this approach merely reflect what is possible within the available 
donor funds, and not the real needs of beneficiaries (IIED, 1994; Bonger, 1999). Thus, 
the second principle states that the outputs of CBNRM should be driven by the interests 
of beneficiaries, rather than by the availability of funds provided by international donor 
support agencies (Bonger, 1999). 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has achieved its objective of constructing a conceptual framework based on 
environmental governance that can facilitate the systemic analysis of CBNRM. The 
framework has illustrated that effective CBEG is critical to effective CBNRM, and thus 
requires the attention it deserves. The onus is on society as a whole to continually adapt, 
refine and adjust CBEG processes to suit specific contexts. The framework is designed to 
facilitate a systemic analysis of CBNRM. It will be used in the next two chapters to 
analyse the Lochinvar CBNRM system on the Kafue Flats of Zambia. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ROLES OF GOVERNMENT AND NGOS IN THE 
LOCHINVAR CBNRM PARTNERSHIP 
4.1 Introduction 
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This chapter aims at applying the conceptual framework to identify and describe the roles 
of the main social actors in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. This partnership exists 
between the Government of Zambia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and is 
found in a flood-plain wetland on the Kafue Flats of Zambia. There are two main 
categories of NGOs in the partnership: community-based organisation (CBO) and 
international donor support agency. The category of CBO consists of the Lochinvar 
Wetlands Management Authority (LWMA) and four Community Development Units 
(CDUs). The four CDUs are Choongo, Nalubamba, Haamusonde and Mungaila. The 
category of international support agencies consists only of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) International. 
Firstly, the chapter identifies and describes the role of the government, which is divided 
into two parts namely, establishing regulatory frameworks and providing support 
services. Secondly, it identifies and describes the role of the NGOs (CBOs and 
international donor support agency). The role of the CBOs is providing for community 
participation in CBNRM, whereas the role of the international donor support agency is 
providing support services. 
4.2 Role of government 
4.2.1 Establishing regulatory frameworks 
The Government of Zambia is one of the main social actors that have been playing an 
important role in shaping the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. According to the WWF-
Zambia Wetlands Project (1 992b), one of its main roles is to establish regulatory 
frameworks. It has been establishing regulatory frameworks for this partnership mainly 
through the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZA W A). The ZA W A is a statutory corporate 
organisation and an agent of the government responsible for regulating the conservation, 
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protection and management of wildlife in Zambia. Thus, all the activities of the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership are regulated by the ZA W A. The ZA W A also regulates 
these activities in the study area mainly through the Zambia Wetlands Project (ZWP). 
The ZWP is a special ''wetlands project" of the government and was established in 1986 
as a response to concerns of growing pressures on wetlands' natural resources (IUCN, 
1992). The idea of establishing a ''wetlands project" emanated from an initiative of a 
regional wetlands programme for Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
countries. This initiative led to increased international interests in the conservation of 
wetlands in Zambia. Subsequently, the government established what was known as the 
WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project with financial support from the WWF International 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1 992b). The project was established in two areas: 
Bangweulu Swamps and Kafue Flats. 
The Kafue Flats Core Project Area (Figure 4.1) was divided into two Wetlands 
Management Units (WMUs). These were Blue Lagoon Wetlands Management Unit 
(BLWMU) on the north bank, and Lochinvar Wetlands Management Unit (LWMU) on 
the south bank. The BL WMU comprises two protected areas namely Blue Lagoon 
National Park and Kafue Flats Game Management Area (GMA)lNorth Bank. The 
LWMU also comprises two protected areas namely Lochinvar National Park and Kafue 
Flats Game Management Area (GMA)lNorth Bank. 
Although the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership has been operating since 1988, it was only 
in 1998 that the government officially established a legislative framework for CBNRM 
partnerships, the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998. According to ART (1999), all 
CBNRM partnerships in Zambia were previously driven through policy, rather than legal 
instruments. The government through the Zambia Wildlife Act endorsed the principles of 
CBEG and acknowledged the need for local communities living closest to natural 
resources to have a say in environmental governancell . It expected to achieve this 
through establishing CBNRM partnerships with local communities. The Act provides for 
the establishment of Community Resource Boards (CRBs) to represent local communities 
II See section 6(1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998. 
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in the partnerships with the government12. It requires the CRBs to be established through 
elections and all their meetings to be democratically conducted. The minutes of all the 
meetings are to be recorded and properly kept. The day-to-day administration of the 
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The government formulated the goals of the ZWP within which the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership operates. The formulation process was done through a consultative workshop 
held in 1986 involving representatives from the government, local communities, donor 
agencies and other stakeholders (TUCN, 1992). The main goal of the project is to 
"conserve the wetlands' natural resources and maintain or enhance their productivities by 
promoting their sustainable use for the development of resident communities" (WWF-
Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b: 6). To achieve this high-level policy goal, the project 
incorporates the principles of community participation. These principles are contained in 
the second goal of the project, which aims "to mobilise local support for the project 
12 See footnote 1 J page 55. 
13 See section 8( 1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998. 
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through active participation of local communities" (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 
1992b: 6). 
The government also established some guidelines for the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. 
These guidelines are contained in the Information Brief for Wetlands Management 
Authorities (WMAs) and Community Development Units (CDUs) (WWF-Zambia 
Wetlands Project, 1992a). This information brief was specially prepared to guide the 
cooperating partners to understand and develop their roles in the CBNRM partnership. 
The ZWP Team, which comprised a project leader, a sociologist, wetlands management 
biologists and project extension officers, prepared the information brief. 
The Lochinvar CBNRM partnership also operates within the arrangements of the 
Administrative Management Design for GMAs (ADMADE) Programme (Jeffery, 1993). 
This is a national programme for all CBNRM partnerships in GMAs. The programme 
was established in 1988 by the government in response to concerns for wildlife poaching 
in National Parks and GMAs. One of the most important features of this programme is its 
revenue sharing system. Through this system, the ZA W A has the government's authority 
to collect revenue from the legal utilisation of wildlife in GMAs. Table 4.1 gives a break 
down of the revenue that was generated from wildlife utilisation in the Kafue Flats 
GMAISouth Bank for the period 1994 - 1999. 
Table 4.1 Breakdown of revenue generated from wildlife utilisation in the Kafue Flats Game 
Management Area/South Bank for the period 1994 - 1999 
Year Safari Hunting (USS) Resident & Non Resident Hunting (ZMK) 
1994 59790 22281000 
1995 60790 45199000 
1996 52650 33609000 
1997 87680 58781500 
1998 63520 61969140 
1999 72100 70030260 
Source: Records of total earmngs for Kafue Flats Game Management Area-South Bank (Sector Annual 
Report, 2000). 
The legal off-take of wildlife in GMAs is classified into three hunting categories: safari 
hunting, non-resident hunting and resident hunting. The safari hunting category generates 
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more revenue than the other categories on the Kafue Flats (WWF-Zambia Wetlands 
Project, 1992a). It involves international clients who pay in United States dollars (US$). 
The revenue generated from this category is classified as licence fees and GMA permits 
(statutory revenue) and hunting rights and concessions (non-statutory revenue). Non-
resident hunting involves Zambians who are not local residents in a GMA, and its clients 
pay in local currency: Zambian Kwacha (ZMK). The revenue generated from this 
category is classified as licence fees and GMA permit (statutory revenue). Resident 
hunting involves Zambians who are local residents in a GMA~ and its clients also pay in 
local currency. The revenue generated from this category is classified only as licence fees 
(statutory revenue). 
The government gets 50% of the revenue collected by the ZA W A from wildlife 
utilisation in the Kafue Flats GMAlSouth Bank. The other 50% is shared according to the 
following formula (Jeffery, 1993): 
.:. 40% to support wildlife management activities in the Kafue Flats GMAlSouth 
Bank; 
.:. 35% as discretionary funds to community development activities in the Kafue 
Flats GMAlSouth Bank; and 
.:. 25% to the ZA WA to support the administration of the ADMADE Programme. 
The ZA W A disburses the 40% and 35% shares on a quarterly basis into the wildlife 
management and community development bank accounts respectively. The Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership is responsible for both accounts. 
The 35% community share is regarded as discretionary funds, which the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership uses to implement community development projects in the Kafue 
Flats GMAlSouth Bank. These projects are implemented on condition that the resource 
users on the Kafue Flats comply with relevant environmental regulations (WWF-Zambia 
Wetlands Project, 1992b). In other words, through the distribution of the benefits from 
the 35% community share, the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership seeks to solicit for 
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compliance with environmental regulations by resource users (WWF-Zambia Wetlands 
Project, 1992b). 
In 1992, using the funds from the 35% community share, the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership started establishing community development projects for the local 
communities in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank. By 1999, the following development 
schemes had been established: construction of two clinics; construction of two schools; 
renovation of a chief's palace; renovation of three schools; construction of a community 
centre; and renovation of a clinical officer's house. In distributing the benefits from these 
schemes, however, the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership does not exclude those persons 
who do not comply with the wildlife laws from enjoying the benefits. These benefits are 
distributed amongst members of local community regardless of whether they comply or 
do not comply with wildlife laws (Ngalaba,pers. com.)14. 
4.2.2 Providing extension services 
The government, through the ZWP Team, has been providing extension services as one 
of its main roles in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 
1 992b ). Through these extension services, the team has been providing professional and 
technical support to this partnership (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). One of the 
extension services is the provision of information to all cooperating partners. The 
information brief discussed in sub-section 4.2.1 above is one of the main instruments that 
the team has used to provide information. As earlier discussed, this information brief was 
designed to guide cooperating partners to understand their roles in the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership. However, it was designed primarily for the purpose of guiding 
members of the LWMA and CDUs, and not ordinary local community members, in 
understanding their roles in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. 
The government has also been providing personnel as another extension service (WWF-
Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). It provides personnel to the LWMA and CDU 
secretariats. The government's personnel in these secretariats are responsible for over-
seeing the implementation of the decisions of the LWMA and CDUs. They also assist 
14 Mr. M. Ngalaba was the ranger-in-charge of the Kafue Flats GMNSouth Bank in 2000. 
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these organisations to develop natural resource management and community 
development programmes. The personnel also play an advisory role for the same 
organisations (Jeffery, 1993). 
The government, through the ZWP Team, has been providing training and education as 
part of the extension services (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1993). The training and 
education programmes are conducted at the Community Development and Conservation 
Training Centre situated on the Kafue Flats. The Community Development and Extension 
(CDE) unit of the ZWP is responsible for designing all these programmes (WWF-Zambia 
Wetlands Project, 1993). Usually, the programmes are based on information generated 
through training needs assessments, which are conducted by the CDE unit. Using this 
information, the ZWP Team conducts workshops and seminars for different target groups 
such as traditional leaders, CBO officials and local community members (WWF -Zambia 
Wetlands Project, 1993). 
In 1992, for example, the ZWP Team conducted two major workshops for all the chiefs 
on the Kafue Flats (Jeffery, 1993). The aim of these workshops was to develop the 
resource management capacities of these traditional leaders. The team also conducted 
seminars to provide members of the LWMA and CDUs with basic managerial skills. In 
1993, it organised three seminars for the members of these CBOs to equip them with 
basic skills in fmancial accounting and budgeting procedures (Jeffery, 1993). 
Through its research unit, the ZWP Team has engaged in research and monitoring as an 
extension service. However, the nature of these services has been mainly biased towards 
wildlife research and monitoring. Accordingly, the information generated through these 
services is mostly useful to the officials of the ZAWA (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 
1992b). Using wildlife biologists, the team conducts annual wild animal population 
censuses on the Kafue Flats as part of the monitoring activities. The ZA WA officials use 
the census results for setting wildlife hunting quotas. The setting of quotas is solely done 
by the ZA W A officials and does not involve other cooperating partners. 
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4.3 Role of NGOs 
4.3.1 CBOs 
The main role of the CBOs in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership is to provide for 
community participation. This role is premised on the main aim of the ZWP. As earlier 
stated, the main aim of the ZWP is to "conserve the wetlands' natural resources and 
maintain or enhance their productivity by promoting their sustainable use for the 
development of resident communities" (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b: 6). In 
order to solicit for local support for this ideology, the project embraces the principles of 
community participation. According to Jeffery (1993), the project's principles of 
community participation are not experimental, but proven principles that were fIrst 
coined by the Lupande Research Project15 • It is envisaged that, by participating and 
benefIting from the project's activities, local communities would be motivated to stop 
illegal utilisation of the wetlands' natural resources and support the project's ideology 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). 
To advance participation in decision-making by local communities in the project's 
activities, the government established two types of CBOs: the L WMA and the four 
CDUs. The four CDUs are Choongo, Nalubamba, Haamusonde and Mungaila. The two 
types of CBOs were established for the purpose of providing for participation in decision-
making (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). The LWMA is responsible for 
ensuring that local communities in the L WMU participate in the activities of the project. 
It is also responsible for coordinating the activities of the four CDUs (WWF- Zambia 
Wetlands Project, 1992a). The four CDUs are responsible for ensuring the project's 
integration with local communities at grass-roots levels. They are the comer stone of 
indirect (representative) participation and represent the interests of local communities on 
the LWMA (Jeffery, 1993). 
15This project was initiated in 1979 to address problems of elephant management and protection in the South Luangwa 
National Park. Its experiences of involving local communities led to the development of a strategy for reducing the 
rampant poaching of wildlife in and around Zambia's National Parks and Game Management Areas. The strategy 
aimed to achieve this by managing wildlife through partnerships with local communities (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). 
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The infonnation brief and other official documents of the ZWP do not explicitly indicate 
how local communities are to directly participate in the decision-making processes of the 
project. However, one activity of direct participation that appears to have prominence in 
the ZWP documents is the Village Scouts Programme (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 
1992b). This programme aims at directly involving local communities in natural resource 
management. Through the programme, members of local communities under go a scouts 
training in wildlife management and law enforcement. Upon completing training, the 
village scouts are sent back to their respective communities to perfonn anti-poaching 
duties. The village scouts are placed under the direct supervision of a unit leader who is 
employed by the ZA WA (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992b). 
4.3.2 International donor support agencies 
The WWF-International is an international donor support agency that has played an 
important role in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. According to the WWF-Zambia 
Wetlands Project (1992b), its main role is to provide donor support services to this 
partnership. Since the inception of the ZWP, this agency has provided fmancial support 
to the partnership. The agency provided the initial funding for all the first community 
development projects of the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. This was before this 
partnership started receiving the 35% share from wildlife hunting. The community 
development projects that were established included a hammer mill, a community shop, a 
curio shop and a conservation and community development-training centre. All these 
development projects eventually collapsed due to poor fmancial management by local 
community members (Jeffery, 1993). 
The WWF-International has also provided fmancial support to the research activities 
mentioned in section 4.4.2 above. As already indicated, the research activities were 
mainly biased towards wildlife research and monitoring. Through the fmancial support of 
the WWF-International, the ZWP Team conducted annual wild animal population 
censuses in the Kafue Flats GMNSouth Bank. The census results were mainly used by 
the ZA W A for setting the quotas for wildlife hunting. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has achieved its objective of applying the conceptual framework to identify 
and describe the roles of the Government of Zambia and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. It has provided an understanding of the 
partnership roles played by these two social actors. Ultimately, the management and 
utilisation of natural resources on the Kafue Flats requires effective CBNRM systems to 
advance the principles of sustainable development. However, the effectiveness of 
CBNRM systems is largely dependent on the nature and quality of the relationships in 
CBNRM partnerships. Hence, the next chapter will apply the conceptual framework to 
assess the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership covering the period 1988 to 2000. 
CHAPTER FIVE 




The purpose of this chapter is to apply the conceptual framework to assess the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership covering the period 1988 to 2000. The framework is systemically 
applied to guide this assessment. The five properties of an effective CBNRM partnership 
identified in the conceptual framework establish the criteria against which to assess the 
field situation of the partnership. These properties are: accountability, transparency, 
participation, shared governance and support for effective CBEG. Accordingly, the 
assessment derives its structure and focus from the properties. Although the properties 
are presented individually, the inevitable interactions among them should not be 
underestimated. Arising from these interactions is a subtle underlying structure that 
influences the behaviour of cooperating partners. 
5.2 Accountability 
According to the conceptual framework, accountability refers to measures that compel 
units/persons in CBNRM partnerships to account for the manner in which they 
performed every function for which they are responsible. To enhance accountability, 
cooperating partners should establish clear lines of authority and responsibility that are 
essential for maintaining the chain and unity of command within a partnership. However, 
this also requires the establishment of three important conditions. 
Firstly, necessary resources must be identified and made available to those responsible. 
Secondly, the authorities required to deploy these resources must be assigned together 
with the responsibilities. Importantly, responsibilities and authorities must be linked; 
otherwise, when they are de-linked and/or assigned to different entities both are eroded. 
Thirdly, the cooperating partners must accept and acknowledge both the authorities and 
responsibilities. 
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The cooperating partners in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership established a number of 
authorities and responsibilities that were structured through a three-tiered organisational 
structure (Figure 5.1). The top level of the structure represented top management (ZWP 
Team) whose main function was to execute the specific objectives of the ZWP. The 
middle level stood for middle management (L WMA), and its main function was to 
implement the CBNRM guidelines so as to achieve the ZWP objectives. Finally, the 
lower level represented lower management (Lochinvar Wildlife Sector and 4 CDUS16) 
whose main function was to plan and implement CBNRM operational plans so as to 
achieve the goals of the CBNRM guidelines (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1 992a). 
The specific authorities and responsibilities for the three management levels are depicted 
in Box 5.1. 
In theory, the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership had clear lines of authorities and 
responsibilities delineated for each of the management levels. In practice, however, the 
situation is different as was evidenced in 1999 during the transformation of the 
department of National Parks and Wildlife Service into a statutory corporate body, the 
ZA W A. Although it was the responsibility of the L WMA to appoint and dismiss village 
scouts, the ZA W A officials retrenched a number of them (Sector Annual Report, 2000). 
This suggests that the chain and unity of command of the organisational structure, which 
are key prerequisites for accountability, were adversely affected. Using the conceptual 
framework, a systemic explanation is that the prospects of enhancing accountability were 
greatly reduced under such conditions. Consequently, measures aimed at compelling 
units or persons to account for their performance in this CBNRM partnership need to take 
into account of these systemic inconsistencies. This situation calls for appropriate 
behaviour and legislation to ensure that cooperating partners, such as the ZA W A, do not 
dictate the regulation of the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership according to their own 
interpretation. However, since legislation is a powerful and potentially rigid tool, it 
should be systemically used with care in the context of cooperative environmental 
governance and complex systems theory. 
16 The four cnus are Choongo, Nalubamba, Haamusonde and Mungaila. However, this assessment focuses 




















Figure 5.1 Tbe tbree-tiered organisational structure of tbe Locbinvar CBNRM partnersbip sbowing 
tbree different management levels and functions. 
Source: Infonnation Brief for Wetlands Management Authorities and Community Development Units 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992a). 
There seems to have been some structural inconsistencies with the manner in which some 
authorities and responsibilities were assigned to the different management levels in the 
organisational structure. On one hand, top and middle management levels were assigned 
a number of authorities cardinal to the execution of their responsibilities, and on the other 
hand, lower management was assigned comparatively fewer authorities required for the 
effective execution of its responsibilities. Although the main function of lower 
management was to plan and implement the CBNRM operational plans so as to achieve 
the goals of the CBNRM guidelines, it did not have the required authorities to effectively 
execute this function. For example, it did not have the authority to raise its own funds 
through income generating activities, to determine hunting quotas, to appoint and dismiss 
scouts, which were all vested in the upper management levels. 
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Box 5.1 The specific authorities and responsibilities for the different management levels of the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership 
TOP MANAGEMENT 
• Prepare and submit annual action plans to the Professional and Technical Committee. 
• Implement annual action plans approved by the Professional and Technical Committee. 
• Formulate long-term strategic plans and decisions for the LWMA. 
• Approve/disapprove annual unit operational plans and budgets submitted by the L WMA. 
• Disburse the 40% wildlife management and 35% community development funds to middle management. 
• Control use of the 40% wildlife management & 35% community development funds . 
• Raise funds for CBNRM u perations through hunting activities. 
• Set hunting quotas for CBNRM activities. 
• Recommend the appointment, transfer and dismissal of government employees to the civil service commission. 
• Provide support to the LWMA in terms of technical advice, scientific information and management resources . 
• Control the implementation of the CBNRM guidelines and annual unit operational plans by the LWMA. 
• Submit reports to the Professional and Technical Committee. 
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 
• Prepare and submit annual unit operational plans and budgets for approval to the top management. 
• Implement annual unit operational plans approved by top management. 
• Approve/disapprove CBNRM operational plans and budgets submitted by Lochinvar wildlife sector and CDUs. 
• Control the implementation ofCBNRM operational plans by Lochinvar wildlife sector and CDUs. 
• Receive and disburse the 40% wildlife management and 35% community development funds. 
• Control the use of the 40% wildlife management and 35% community development funds . 
• Raise funds through income generating activities (other than hunting) for CBNRM operations. 
• Recommend hunting quotas to top management. 
• Appoint, transfer and dismiss village scouts. 
• Recommend the appointment, transfer and dismissal of government employees to top management. 
• Submit CBNRM and fmancial reports to top management. 
LOWER MANAGEMENT 
Lochinvar wildlife sector 
• Prepare and submit wildlife management operational plans and budgets for approval to the LWMA. 
• Implement wildlife management operational plans approved by the LWMA. 
• Enforce wildlife act. 
• Receive and utilise the 40% wildlife management funds from the L WMA. 
• Recommend the dismissal of village scouts (in consultation with the CDUs) to the LWMA. 
• Recommend the dismissal of government employees to the provincial wildlife warden. 
• Submit wildlife management and fmancial reports to the L WMA. 
Community development units 
• Identify community development needs. 
• Prepare and submit community development project proposals and budgets for approval to the L WMA. 
• Implement community development projects approved by the L WMA. 
• Provide for local community participation in the implementation of the community development projects. 
• Receive and utilise the 35% community development funds from the L WMA. 
• Recommend the appointment of village scouts (in consultation with the CDUs) to the LWMA. 
• Submit community development and fmancial reports to the L WMA. 
. . 
Source: Infonnabon Bnef for Wetlands Management Authonbes and Commumty Development Units 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992a). 
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These fmdings suggest that some responsibilities and authorities were de-linked and 
assigned to different levels of management. As a result, the practicability of effectively 
executing them was adversely affected. According to the conceptual framework, 
responsibilities and authorities must be linked; otherwise, when they are de-linked and/or 
assigned to different entities both are eroded. For this reason, the prospects of enhancing 
accountability in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership were reduced under these 
conditions. Although this study appreciates that effective CBEG does not necessarily 
entail the abrogation of authorities by relevant management levels, it is important that 
measures should have been taken to ensure that the authorities required for the effective 
implementation of CBNRM plans were assigned together with the responsibilities. 
Importantly, it should have been realised that the innovative sharing of environmental 
governance authorities and responsibilities in a mutually supportive environment is key 
to effective CBEG. This systemically brings to the fore the concept of shared governance, 
which is one of the cardinal properties of effective CBNRM partnerships. 
Another example that illustrates the incapability of the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership to 
effectively enhance accountability emerges from proceedings of the L WMA. These 
proceedings were supposed to be conducted through bi-annual meetings held in June and 
December (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992a). However, these meetings were 
eventually discontinued in 1996 after the WWF-International officially withdrew its 
fmancial support to the ZWP17. From the inception of the L WMA, the meetings were 
funded by the WWF-International through the ZWP. 
In 1995, the average cost of one meeting was about ZMK 3 million (US$ 3500)18. This 
money was mainly used for the transport and lodging expenses of the 26 L WMA 
members during the meetings. Each of the 26 members attending these meetings was paid 
a sitting allowance of about ZMK 30 000 (US$ 35) per day (on average the meetings 
were held for two days)19. 
17 See section 5.7 for the reasons that led the WWF-International to withdrew its fmancial support to the 
ZWP. 
18 The 1995 exchange rate of ZMK was 857 per US$l. 
19 The figures are derived from the 1995 fmancial report for the LWMA. 
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A number of fundamental concerns emerge from these figures. Firstly, according to the 
interviews conducted during the study, ''the government remunerates its own employees 
by way of salaries for working for the L WMA" (Mutti, pers. com. )20. Therefore, one 
wonders why government employees were also paid sitting allowances for attending the 
bi-annual meetings, when they were already getting salaries for the same. If indeed the 
allowances were that important, then why was government not expected to pay for its 
own members? 
Secondly, the fact that the bi-annual meetings were discontinued after the WWF-
International withdrew its fmancial support suggests that the proceedings of the L WMA 
could not be fmancially sustained without donor support. Although this accentuates the 
vulnerability of CBNRM partnerships to the vagaries of the dependency syndrome and 
the unrealistic time frames propagated by donor agencies, it should not, however, have 
warranted the discontinuation of the bi-annual meetings. Importantly, it should have been 
realised that meetings are a necessary process for fostering effective CBEG (Esman and 
Uphoff, 1984). For example, the holding of regular meetings by cooperating partners can 
enhance the prospects of having an effective representation of interests in decision-
making processes. By so doing, the resultant decisions can be recognised and accepted by 
all stakeholders. 
Given the significance of meetings in promoting effective CBEG, the cooperating 
partners should have cooperated and taken measures to ensure that the LWMA bi-annual 
meetings were constructively budgeted for. Indeed one might ask why the large-scale 
structure of the LWMA was not reduced to a small-scale structure, and why the 
frequency of the meetings was not reduced from bi-annual to annual. The size of an 
organisation is critical to the effective implementation of CBNRM plans. Small-scale 
organisations can be more effective for the majority of rural community members 
especially during the initial stages of CBNRM initiatives (for example see Esman and 
Uphoff, 1984). This is because their operations are simpler and manageable especially in 
terms of financial resources. Given the fmancial limitations of the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership, the notion of starting off with a small-scale structure for the L WMA could 
20 Mr. M. Mutti is a fonner ZWP extension officer (1990-2000) currently based in Mulundu Ward, Monze. 
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have signified effective CBEG. The cost of the bi-annual meetings seems unjustifiable 
and may be reasonably questioned given the large-scale structure of the L WMA as well 
as the number of meetings that were held per year. 
In summation, it is tempting to suggest that there is evidence to believe that the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership did not effectively enhance accountability. With the 
discontinuation of the bi-annual meetings, the chain and unity of command of the 
organisational structure were adversely affected. As a result, the hierarchy required for 
establishing a systemic arrangement of positions and jobs in the organisational structure 
was weakened. Furthermore, the cost of the bi-annual meetings prompts one to question 
the capability of the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership to effectively foster accountability 
and support effective CBEG. What seems to be emerging from the fmdings is that there 
was more commitment to obtaining income (sitting allowances) than contributing to 
effective CBEG. That the emergent problems were undesirable to the partnership reflects 
a lack of appreciation of the structure and processes underlying the problems. 
5.3 Transparency 
Transparency is concerned with the free flow of information to all the cooperating 
partners concerned with a particular CBNRM partnership. It can be effectively enhanced 
through the establishment of both internal and external channels of communication for a 
CBNRM partnership. For the purposes this study, it implies that cooperating partners 
should establish internal and external reporting lines amongst themselves. It should also 
encompass the three prerequisites of transparency: disclosure of information to all 
cooperating partners; free access to the official documents of CBNRM partnerships by all 
cooperating partners; and free access to the meetings of CBNRM partnerships by all 
cooperating partners. 
Theoretically, the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership seems to have established clear 
internal reporting lines amongst the different management levels. As illustrated in Box 
5.1, lower management was required to submit reports to middle management, middle 
management to top management, and top management to the Professional and Technical 
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of the ZA W A; and vice versa. These reporting lines established internal channels of 
communication, which are vital prerequisites for transparency. 
However, effective transparency requires the establishment of both internal and external 
channels of communication linking all cooperating partners. In the case of the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership, only internal channels of communication were established amongst 
the three management levels within its organisational structure. External channels of 
communication linking to key stakeholders such as ordinary local community members 
were not explicitly established. Based on the conceptual framework, it is argued that 
transparency cannot be effectively enhanced under these conditions. 
The study identified three other factors that may exacerbate the adverse conditions that 
were created by the lack of external channels of communication. Firstly, cooperating 
partners in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership were not bound by any law, policy or 
guidelines to disclose information to other stakeholders. Nowhere is it stipulated that 
cooperating partners have to disclose information pertaining to their activities and 
performance. Secondly, there is no law, policy or guidelines that provide members of the 
local communities with rights of access to the documents of the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership. Thirdly, there is no provision that allows members of the local communities 
to attend the cooperating partners' meetings (Ministry of Tourism, 1998; Muchachacha, 
pers. com. 21 ; Ngalaba,pers. com. 22). These three factors, however, are cardinal to the free 
flow of information in a CBNRM partnership. Therefore, it is further argued that, under 
the given arrangements, the prospects for the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership to enhance 
transparency were reduced. 
According to the conceptual framework, the concept of transparency is systemically 
linked to the other properties of an effective CBNRM partnership especially 
accountability. If there is no free flow of information concerning the performance and 
processes of a CBNRM partnership, it is practically impossible to compel cooperating 
partners to account for the manner in which they performed their functions. Given that 
the concept of transparency was not adequately incorporated in the Lochinvar CBNRM 
21 Mr. A. Muchachacha is an administrative officer of the ZA WA. 
22 Mr. M. Ngalaba was the Ranger-in- Charge of the Kafue Flats GMNSouth Bank in 2000. 
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partnership, it is argued that this partnership did not appreciate the inherent complexity in 
CBNRM. 
5.4 Participation 
The concept of participation is one of the core properties of effective CBNRM 
partnerships. For the purposes of this study, it is defmed as a process in which 
cooperating partners are involved in making decisions that affect their lives (Silitshena 
and Masacorale, 1999). It was conceptualised in the framework that the interests and 
rights of cooperating partners can be safeguarded through their participation in the 
decision-making processes of CBNRM partnerships. By so doing, the resultant decisions 
can be recognised and accepted by all cooperating partners. To enhance participation, 
cooperating partners should establish necessary features that foster effective participation 
in decision-making processes. Importantly, the majority of ordinary local community 
members should democratically participate either through direct participation where they 
engage in decision-making processes directly, or indirect participation where they engage 
in decision-making processes indirectly through elected representatives. Through such 
approaches, the prospects of having their views and interests represented in CBNRM 
partnerships can be enhanced. 
The fmdings of this study indicated that some features of the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership did not effectively enhance the principle of democratic participation in 
decision-making by the majority of local community members. For example, all the 26 
recommended members of the 1988 design of the L WMA membership were to be 
appointed by the ZA W A, with the exception of the vice-chairperson who was elected by 
local communities (Table 5.1). This arrangement indicates that the design of the LWMA 
membership did not represent a 'community-based' entity that provides for democratic 
participation of the majority of ordinary local community members. Importantly, it means 
that the interests and rights of these key stakeholders could not be effectively safeguarded 
under such an arrangement. 
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Table 5.1 Membership of the Lochinvar Wetlands Management Authority 
1988 1000 
Recommended Members Position Members actually Position 
workinll 
- One district council secretary LWMA chairperson (ex- - One district Council Secretary LWMA chairperson 
(employed by Ministry of Local officio member appointed by (employed by Ministry of (ex-officio member 
Government) theZAWA) Local Government) appointed by the 
ZAWA) 
- One local community member LWMA vice chairperson - One COU representative (also LWMA ordinary 
(elected by local chairperson of the LWMA members (appointed 
communities) finance sub-committee) by the ZAWA) 
- Two members of parliament L WMA ordinary members - One wildlife warden LWMA secretariat 
- Two local political leaders (appointed by the ZA W A) (Secretary) members (ex-officio 
- Two senior representatives of - One project extension officer members appointed by 
appropriate organisations - One wetlands bio logist theZAWA) 
- Two co-opted members - One unit leader 
(All these were employed by 
- Eight COU representatives theZAWA) 
- Four COU patrons (ex-officio) 
(Chiefs Choongo, Haamusonde, 
Mungaila and Nalubamba) 
- One wildlife warden L WMA secretariat members 
(Secretary) (ex-officio members 
- One project extension officer appointed by the ZA W A) 
- One wetlands biologist 
- One unit leader 
(All these were employed by the 
ZAWA) 
. . Source: Infonnatton Bnef for Wetlands Management Authonttes and Commuruty development Umts 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992a). 
The design of the L WMA membership points to a somewhat limited conceptual 
framework of the structure and dynamics of a CBNRM partnership. It gives one the 
impression that it does not regard ordinary local community members as key role players 
whose interests and rights have to be constructively safeguarded. Significantly, it reflects 
a lack of appreciation of the potential systemic effects of not democratically safeguarding 
their interests and rights. For instance, the prospects of soliciting the support of these 
stakeholders to effective CBEG would be adversely affected if their interests and rights 
were not constructively safeguarded. Therefore, it important that the L WMA membership 
should have been designed in such a way that ordinary local community members were 
allowed to elect the majority of the L WMA members. Such an approach would have 
signified, in general, an appreciation of systems thinking, and in particular the important 
role played by ordinary local community members in CBNRM processes and structures. 
74 
Another issue that emerges from the L WMA membership relates to the operations of the 
members who were still working in 2000 after the LWMA bi-annual meetings were 
discontinued. The study revealed that only 6 out of the 26 recommended members 
continued to work for the LWMA after these meetings were discontinued (Table 5.l). As 
shown in the table, the 6 members comprised only 1 local community representative 
drawn from a CDU, and 5 ex-officio members who were all government employees. 
According to Mutti (pers. com. )23, ''the local community representative continued to work 
for the L WMA because he is a signatory to the community development bank account of 
the LWMA." He further revealed that the 5 ex-officio members continued to work 
because government was remunerating them by way of salaries for working for the 
L WMA. They could not therefore withdraw their services from the L WMA, even if the 
bi-annual meetings were suspended. 
These fmdings suggest that, as with the 26 recommended members, the composition of 
the 6 members did not signify democratic participation of local communities in CBNRM. 
It is important to note that this scenario has complex implications for the other properties 
of a CBNRM partnership. For instance, under this scenario, the prospects of fostering 
accountability and transparency are greatly undermined. Moreover, the scenario does not 
even reflect the concepts of shared governance and support for effective CBEG. 
Therefore, that the cooperating partners did not take measures aimed at correcting the 
situation gives the impression that an understanding of the Lochinvar CBNRM system as 
a complex system was generally lacking. 
The scenario of the L WMA was similar to the situation in the Choongo Community 
Development Unit (CCDU). However, there were not as many disparities between the 
1988 recommended membership and the 2000 membership of the CCDU. As shown in 
Table 5.2, the 2000 membership of the CCDU still had the recommended 24 members. 
However, two major concerns that are worth noting emerge from this membership. 
23 See footnote 20 page 69. 
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Table 5.2 Membership of the Choongo Community Development Unit 
1
1988 " ,~d 
4' , I 2000 'i;Wi!fi'" .iw:ll~j{ @%%I/\" -±,.' 1M (lAi""m . m" £ 
Recommended members Positions Members operati!JK Positions " ,,-
- One local community COU chairperson (elected by - One local COU chairperson (appointed by Chief 
member local community) community member Choongo) 
- One local community COU vice chairperson (elected - One local One COU vice chairperson (appointed 
member by local community) community member by ChiefChoongo) 
- One chief COU patron (ex-officio member - One chief One COU patron (ex-officio member 
appointed by the ZA WA) appointed by the ZA W A) 
- Seven local community COU ordinary members (elected - Seven local COU ordinary members (elected by 
members by local community) community local community) 
members 
- One local community COU secretariat members (all - One local COU secretariat members (all are ex-
member (COU secretary) are ex-officio members community member officio members appointed by the 
- One project extension appointed by the ZA W A, except (COU secretary) ZA W A, except for the secretary who is 
officer for the secretary who is elected - One project elected by local community) 
- One unit Leader by local community) extension officer 
- One bookkeeper - One unit Leader 
- One bookkeeper 
- Four village headmen COU ordinary members - Four village COU ordinary members (appointed by 
- Two local political leaders (appointed by the ZA W A) headmen theZAWA) 
- Two senior representatives - Two local political 
of appropriate organisations leaders 




- Two co-opted 
members 
Source: Infonnation Brief for Wetlands Management Authorities and Community development Units 
(WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992a). 
Firstly, instead of having an elected chairperson and vice chairperson as recommended, 
the two positions were filled through appointments in the 2000 membership. According 
to Mwiinga (pers. com.)24, ''the chief, who is the patron of the CCDU, merely appointed 
two local community members to fill these positions." This arrangement raises questions 
that are critical to the success of the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. Importantly, it 
raises questions about the role of traditional governance systems in CBNRM 
partnerships. What role should traditional leaders play in CBNRM partnerships? Should 
traditional and modem democratic governance systems be harmonised in CBNRM 
24 Mr. K. Mwiinga was the secretary of the CCDU in 2000. 
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partnerships? These are important questions that have systemic implications for the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership, and thus deserve attention. 
Secondly, although the 2000 membership had 7 representatives elected by local 
communities, the majority of the members (17) were appointed by the ZAWA (Table 
5.2). These results suggest that the membership of the CCDU did not truly represent 
democratic participation of local communities in CBNRM. Being a 'community-based' 
organisation that provides for local community participation in CBNRM, it could have 
been better if the majority of the members in the CCDU were elected representatives. 
5.5 Shared governance 
The definition of shared governance was addressed in the conceptual framework. In 
simple terms, the concept implies that cooperating partners in CBNRM partnerships have 
to share environmental governance authorities and responsibilities. This is based on the 
premise that environmental governance is not a preserve of one cooperating partner 
(usually implying governments), and as such the accompanying authorities and 
responsibilities have to be innovatively shared amongst all partners. The need for 
governments to be catalytic forces for creating an enabling and supportive environment 
for sharing environmental governance authorities and responsibilities was identified. 
Therefore, governments are expected to allow and encourage NOOs to play their 
partnership roles responsibly and effectively in effective CBNRM partnerships. 
The study revealed there were some indicators that suggest that the concept of shared 
governance is being practiced within the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. This was 
illustrated through the Village Scouts Programme in which both government and village 
scouts work together in their efforts to enforce the Zambia Wildlife Act. Collectively, 
they conduct wildlife management programmes in the Kafue Flats OMAISouth Bank. 
The L WMA and CDUs also epitomise the application of the concept. As illustrated in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the memberships of these organisations consist of both government 
offIcials and local community members. Collectively, they make authoritative decisions 
and take actions as cooperating partners (for example, see WWF-Zambia Wetlands 
Project, 1992a). 
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However, the study also revealed some instances in which the government's ability to 
share environmental governance authorities and responsibilities is questionable. This is 
particularly the case with some of the arrangements of the ADMADE Programme. Under 
these arrangements, for example, the government solely: collects all the revenue from the 
legal utilisation of wildlife; determines and sets the hunting quotas, and; conducts all the 
wildlife culling programmes (for example, see Jeffery, 1993). Under these settings, it is 
argued that the government does not create an enabling and supportive environment for 
sharing environmental governance authorities and responsibilities. Although it could be 
also argued that some tasks are too technical for some cooperating partners (such as 
ordinary local community members), the government should endeavour to be flexible so 
as to build the capacity of such partners to take on new roles and responsibilities. By so 
doing, their needs and aspirations can be productively incorporated into CBNRM 
partnerships. This can in tum increase the prospects of the resultant decisions and actions 
gaining relevance and acceptability amongst the partners. 
5.6 Support for effective CBEG 
The conceptual framework underscored the need for cooperating partners in CBNRM 
partnerships to be continually supportive of the principles of effective CBEG as they 
endeavour to execute their partnership roles. In carrying out these roles, they should 
regard effective CBEG as an ongoing process requiring continuous investment of effort, 
adaptation and adjustment. To this end, they should establish appropriate time frames and 
provide adequate resources to advance the principles (and their application) of effective 
CBEG. Therefore, they are required to continually adapt to the circumstances and time 
frames of particular CBNRM partnerships, and reorient their attitudes and behaviours 
through trust building and interactive dialogue. 
The study revealed there were some indicators that suggest that the cooperating partners 
in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership were supportive of effective CBEG. For example, 
it was evident that the Government of Zambia played an important role in the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership by establishing regulatory frameworks. These frameworks included 
the Policy for National Parks and Wildlife in Zambia, the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 12 of 
1998, the ADMADE Programme, and the Information Brief for Wetlands Management 
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Authorities (WMAs) and Community Development Units (CDUs). In general, the 
frameworks made provision for the establishment of CBNRM processes in the Kafue 
Flats GMAISouth Bank that can, if well articulated, advance the ideals of sustainable 
natural resource utilisation. As illustrated in chapter three, the government also played an 
important role by providing extension services25• These services were provided mainly 
through the ZWP Team and included providing technical personnel, training and 
education, and research and monitoring. The WWF-Intemational was responsible for 
providing fmancial resources to enable the ZWP Team offer the services. Such services 
are vital for the successful management of the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership, 
particularly from the perspective that they can enhance the capacity of cooperating 
partners to perform. All these actions illustrate that in some ways the cooperating partners 
were supportive of effective CBEG. 
However, there are also other actions that could prompt one to suggest that the 
cooperating partners were not supportive of effective CBEG. For example, as explained 
below, the failure by the government to disseminate information to local communities 
about the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership is indicative of government's inadequate 
support for effective CBEG. This is because, according to the conceptual framework, 
governments should be supportive by disseminating information that can enhance the 
capacity of local community members. Such information is vital to assist them to 
understand how they can take advantage of the opportunities offered by CBNRM 
partnerships. However, the study revealed that the Zambian government had never 
disseminated information on the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership to local communities in 
the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank. According to Ngalaba (pers. com.i 6, ''the government 
has not officially provided [this] information to ordinary local community members in the 
GMA." He further explained that there had never been a deliberate government policy 
aimed at disseminating such information. 
25 See section 4.2.2 of chapter four. 
26 See footnote 20 page 69. 
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Some senior government officials supported the views of Ngalaba (pers. com.). For 
example, according to Mwima (pers. com. )27, "information [about the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership] has not travelled widely or clearly enough. There are a lot of 
ordinary local community members who do not know about the partnership. We need a 
better way of disseminating this information to these people." Thala (pers. com. /8 was of 
the opinion that the condition of lack of information is exacerbated by government's 
failure to translate the information in CBNRM policies into the various local languages of 
Zambia. According to her, ''there is need for government to translate the information in 
CBNRM policies into plain language. This information is supposed to be translated into 
Zambian local languages so that it can reach as many people as possible. However, this 
has not yet been realised." 
These results prompt one to question the government's support for effective CBEG vis-a-
vis dissemination of information. Local communities as key stakeholders need 
information about the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership to enhance the prospects for them 
to make informed decisions about how they can take advantage of the various 
opportunities offered by the partnership. Without sufficient information, local community 
members may not make informed decisions and act as constructive stakeholders in the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. Such information gaps have complex structural 
implications for the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. For example, these stakeholders 
may not have the knowledge to know what actions comply or do not comply with 
environmental laws. Such a situation can ultimately generate ''middle number" or 
dynamic problems for the partnership, such as uncontrolled utilisation of natural 
resources. That the government did not take measures aimed at disseminating information 
gives the impression that an understanding of the Lochinvar CBNRM system as a 
complex system was lacking. 
The records of non-compliance with wildlife regulations by local communities in the 
Kafue Flats GMAlSouth Bank can be interpreted as an indication of inadequate support 
to effective CBEG on the part oflocal communities (Table 5.3). This is because, 
27 Mr. H. Mwima was the acting Direct General of the ZA WA in 2000. 
28 Mrs. E. J1uda is a former chief parliamentary draughtsman of Ministry of Legal Affairs. 
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according to the conceptual framework, local communities are expected to be supportive 
of effective CBEG by complying with relevant environmental laws. However, as 
depicted in Table 5.3, there were 702 cases of non-compliance by local communities in 
the Kafue Flats/South Bank from 1992-1999. This was in spite of the law enforcement 
efforts (1298 patrol days) and the benefits distributed29 by the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership in the same period. 
Table 5.3 Records of non-compliance with wildlife regulations by local communities in the Kafue 
Flats GMt A a/S th B k f 1992 1999 ame ana2emen re ou an rom -
No. of patrols condllcted by 
Year Cases of non-eompliance wildlife SCOllts No. of patrol d~ 
1999 96 71 167 
1998 90 60 157 
1997 43 64 160 
1996 103 80 180 
1995 88 58 151 
1994 94 82 166 
1993 90 78 150 
1992 98 60 167 
Total 702 553 1298 
(Source: Annual Sector Reports from 1992-1999). 
Although a comprehensive analysis of these results would require more baseline 
information than provided here to make useful conclusions, it is tempting to suggest the 
perpetuation of the cases of non-compliance is, at least in part, a reflection of non-
systemic approaches to problem situations. It is clear that the partners are using a non-
systemic approach by targeting a single aspect of CBNRM i.e. compliance with wildlife 
laws by local communities. This approach illustrates a lack of appreciation of the scale of 
the complexity involved. For a start, illegal use of wildlife is a dynamic problem, which 
requires a systemic approach. This is because it is clear from the fmdings that the 
interventions of law enforcement and benefit distribution are generating different effects 
in the short and long term (Table 5.3). Furthermore, it is clear that these effects over time 
are not obvious. In other words, the causes and effects of this problem are subtle. 
Therefore, the ability of the cooperating partners to see the structure underlying the 
problem is questionable given that they are merely targeting illegal use of wildlife. 
29 See section 4.2.1 and Table 4.1 in chapter four for an account on benefit distribution. 
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Taking into account the limited baseline information of this study, it is argued that the 
structure underlying the problem involves more interactions than is presumed in the law 
enforcement-compliance-benefit distribution structure adopted by the Lochinvar 
CBNRM partnership. The cooperating partners are failing to see the ways in which: 
firstly, the variables in the law enforcement-compliance-benefit distribution structure are 
interacting with each other; secondly, the variables are influencing and being influenced 
by other variables unnoticed or overlooked by the partners. For example, as already 
illustrated, governments inability to effectively share governance and disseminate 
information could influence compliance in ways the cooperating partners cannot discern. 
Therefore, this study contends that the application of the law enforcement-compliance-
benefit distribution structure reflects a somewhat limited appreciation of the inherent 
complexity in CBNRM. 
Another example that illustrates the lack of support for effective CBEG by the 
cooperating partners involves the WWF-International. It is worth noting that the WWF-
International, a donor support agency providing donor support to the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership, withdrew this support in 1995. This study attributed the withdrawal of the 
support to inadequate support for effective CBEG. The provision of this support began in 
1986 and was supposed to have continued beyond 1995 (WWF-Zambia Wetlands 
Project, 1993). The reasons advanced for the withdrawal of support were not consistently 
stated. According to a circular distributed by the project leader of the ZWP, ''the WWF-
International has decided to withdraw its support due to fmancial constraints as a result of 
the prevailing global financial crisis experienced by most international donor support 
agencies,,30. This statement, however, was contrary to the interviews that were conducted 
during the study. According to Muchachacha (pers. com.)31, who categorically refuted the 
claims of the project leader, ''the WWF-International purely withdrew its fmancial 
support after some senior officials of the ZA W A wanted to be in control of all the 
fmances provided by the WWF-International." He further explained that all along the 
project leader, who was employed by the WWF-International, controlled these finances. 
30 The circular, entitled "Discontinuation of the WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project" and dated 14th May 1995, 
was written by the project leader and circulated to all staff members working in the ZWP areas 
31 See 6 above. . 
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The WWF-International objected to the proposals of the senior officials and subsequently 
withdrew its fmancial support. Muchachacha affirmed that efforts aimed at seeking 
consensus through means such as dialogue were futile. 
The validity and reliability of these statements would require detailed investigations and 
analysis, which are beyond the scope of this study. However, using the conceptual 
framework, the withdrawal of support can be attributed to inadequate support for 
effective CBEG by both the government and the WWF-International. What seems to be 
emerging from this study is that the two did not develop trust for each other. This is 
because they did not agree on who was to manage the fmances. According to the 
conceptual framework, trust building is one of the key principles of cooperative 
environmental governance. Importantly, it helps to foster legitimate relationships 
amongst cooperating partners. Therefore, it is important that the cooperating partners 
should have put in place measures aimed at building trust within the partnership that 
could be used to resolve differences. 
The statements from the ZWP project leader and the ZA W A administrative officer 
provide some useful insights into Senge's (1990) concept of "event explanations." Senge 
contends that when asked to explain their decisions people usually focus on events and 
personalities. These explanations are often laden with ''who did what to whom" 
expressions (Senge, 1990). This concept is demonstrated in the statements from the ZWP 
project leader and the ZA W A administrative officer. When requested to explain why 
donor support had been discontinued, the two officials offered "event" explanations: 
"The WWF-International has decided to withdraw its support due to flnancial constraints as a 
result of the prevailing global fmancial crisis experienced by most international donor support 
agencies" (WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project, 1992a). 
"The WWF-International purely withdrew its fmancial support after some senior offIcials of the 
ZAWA wanted to be in control of all the fmances provided by the WWF-International" 
(11uchachacha,pers. corn). 
It is clear from these statements that the two officials were focusing on events and 
personalities: prevailing global financial crisis (event) and senior officials of the ZAWA 
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(personalities). According to Senge (1990), such non-systemic explanations prevent 
people from seeing the underlying structures, which influence individual behaviours and 
actions. He explains that these underlying structures are usually responsible for the 
conditions in which types of events become likely. As such, there is need for people to 
develop the capacity to constructively manipulate the structures within which they 
operate. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has achieved its objective of applying the conceptual framework to assess 
the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership covering the period 1988 and 2000. The five 
properties of an effective CBNRM partnership provided the criteria against which to 
assess this partnership. The systemic and structured approach adopted in the assessment 
generated some useful fmdings on the field situation of the partnership. The assessment 
has shown that the context in which CBNRM partnerships are established and 
implemented is complex. The impression that emanates from this assessment is that the 
partners in the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership did not understand and appreciate this 
complexity. This is attributed to the application of inappropriate conceptual frameworks 
that lack a systemic approach. If, however, a systemic framework had been applied to 
guide the cooperating partners, then some of the undesirable outcomes could have been 
foreseen and avoided. 
The application of the conceptual framework at a local level has provided useful insights 
into the inherent complexity in CBNRM. The following chapter will attempt to assess the 
application of the framework at a broader scale. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REVISITING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
6.1 Introduction 
The stated aim of this study is to expose through a systemic approach the 
complexity and centrality of governance in CBNRM. This is premised on the 
hypothesis that an appreciation of this complexity and of drawing analytic 
distinctions between governance and management is necessary for successful 
interventions. To this end, a conceptual framework based on effective CBEG was 
developed in chapter 3 as an intellectual tool for systemically analysing the 
Lochinvar CBNRM system. This framework was applied in chapter 4 to assist the 
study to identify and describe the roles of the cooperating partners in the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. In chapter 5, it was applied to assess the 
Lochinvar CBNRM partnership covering the period 1988 to 2000. The application 
of the framework at a local level provided useful empirical insights into CBNRM 
processes. This chapter aims at revisiting the framework by exploring the 
challenges and opportunities of applying it at a broader scale. 
6.2 Dealing with complexity 
The application of the conceptual framework at a local level illustrated that CBNRM 
processes are established and implemented in a complex socio-biophysical context. The 
dynamics of this complex context include socio-political, economic, cultural, ecological 
and institutional forces. It was observed that social actors on the Kafue Flats did not 
constructively understand and appreciate this complexity. This was attributed to 
reductionist approaches that deal with emerging problems separately. The problems that 
emerged such as the withdrawal of donor support by the WWF-Intemational and the 
discontinuation of the L WMA bi-annual meetings are a good demonstration of the effects 
of these approaches. These problems were multi-scale involving interactions across 
different variables. That these problems were detrimental to the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership reflects a lack of appreciation of the structure and processes underlying the 
problems. 
85 
These observations accord well with the current thinking in complex systems theory 
(McCarthy, 1996; Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; Foster et ai., 2001). The 
fundamental argument of the proponents of this theory is that complex systems cannot be 
reduced to component mechanisms without losing the essence of holism (Kay and Foster, 
1999). According to McCarthy (1996: 35), ''the challenge of irreducible complexity and 
breaking the riddle of wholeness cannot be met by reductionist approaches." He further 
elucidates that these approaches involve breaking a problem into components, studying 
each part in isolation, and then drawing conclusions about the whole. Senge (1990) 
argues that this sort of linear and mechanistic thinking is increasingly becoming an 
ineffective approach for dealing with complex modem-day problems. This is because 
most of the critical socio-biophysical issues and concerns are interrelated in ways that 
defy linear causation (Senge, 1990; Foster et ai., 2001). On the other hand circular 
causation, where a variable is both the cause and effect of another, is increasingly 
becoming the standard, rather than the exception (Senge, 1990). 
By viewing CBNRM systems as complex systems, the conceptual framework offered this 
study a useful heuristic for exploring complex socio-biophysical challenges and 
opportunities. The understanding provided by complex systems theory suggests that 
problems emerging from complex systems are inherently multi-scale and involve 
interactions across different variables (Kay and Foster, 1999). This necessitates social 
actors to look beyond personalities and events to understand emerging complex problems 
(Senge, 1990). The phenomenon of focusing on personalities and events was exemplified 
through the responses generated from both the WWF-International and the ZA WA 
officials vis-a-vis the withdrawal of donor support (see section 5.7 in chapter 5). These 
empirical insights into complex situations further justify the calls from the proponents of 
complex systems theory and systems thinking that actors need to look into the underlying 
structures which influence individual behaviours and actions (Senge, 1990; McCarthy, 
1996; Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; Foster et ai., 2001). According to Senge 
(1990), these structures generate conditions in which forms of events become likely. He 
further asserts that there is need for actors to continually develop the capacity to 
constructively manipulate the structures within which they operate. However, he cautions 
that this is feasible only if they start "seeing interrelationships rather than linear cause-
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effect chains, and patterns of change not just snapshots" (Senge, 1990: 73). This 
understanding of complex systems theory justifies a strong concern for systems thinking. 
6.3 The framework as part of systems thinking 
Systems thinking is increasingly becoming a useful intellectual methodology for 
facilitating structured inquiries into complex issues and concerns (Senge, 1990; Kay and 
Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; Cohen, 2001). It is premised on the understanding that we 
need better ways for dealing with complexity (Foster et al., 2001). Senge (1990) contends 
that it is offered as an approach that can facilitate structured analyses of complex 
problems. However, for systems thinking to become a reality, its tools must be expressed 
in terms that are understandable and usable (Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; Foster 
et al., 2001). McCarthy (1996) argues that part of the criticism of systems thinking is that 
most of the tools used in applying it are so obscure that most people cannot apply them to 
their specific situations. 
In order to develop an explicit and comprehensible systems-based tool for analysing 
CBNRM, this study had to position environmental governance as the core variable in the 
conceptual framework. This is because environmental governance was identified as an 
holistic and distinct heuristic variable capable of addressing the complex issues and 
concerns of CBNRM in a structured manner. Likewise, the application of this variable 
allowed the study to look at CBNRM from a systemic and broad perspective, including 
their underlying structures and processes. Importantly, it also provided an appreciation of 
the complexity within which these systems operate. This approach accords well with 
Walker (2000: 23) who contends that "an appreciation of a system's complexity is 
necessary to provide a foundation for systemic methodologies and tools." He further 
explains that otherwise these methodologies and tools may not be generalisable and give 
clues into the causes of particular problems. 
Given that the conceptual framework adopted an holistic and systemic approach, this 
study argues that it can be positioned within the broader realm of systems thinking 
(Senge, 1990; McCarthy, 1996; Kay and Foster, 1999; Walker, 2000; Cohen, 2001; 
Foster et al., 2001). Within this realm, it can be used as a systems-based tool for 
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identifying and elucidating the underlying causes of complex issues and concerns (Senge, 
1990; Kay and Foster, 1999; Cohen, 2001). 
The implication of the conceptual framework as a systems-based tool for CBNRM policy 
and practice is that it offers social actors a leverage to analyse CBNRM from a systemic 
and broad perspective. This approach can allow social actors to interpret underlying 
interrelationships and patterns of change in CBNRM. It can assist them to focus on 
structures that provoke behaviours that determine events, rather than reacting to events 
(Senge, 1990). Accordingly, social actors can employ the conceptual framework as a 
point of reference for understanding important interrelationships in CBNRM processes 
and structures. They can constructively apply it as a systemic approach for seeing how 
their roles are interrelated. In so doing, they can begin to understand their functional roles 
and how these roles influence each other. The framework can also assist them to identify 
any patterns of change and relationships that were previously unnoticed. As social actors 
begin to see the dynamic complexity in CBNRM processes, they can be at a greater 
advantage when diagnosing complex emergent problems, identifying their consequences, 
and the changes needed (Senge, 1990). 
6.4 Usefulness of the framework 
In chapter 1, the exploration of conservation and development trends revealed that 
Africa's natural resource management takes place in complex socio-biophysical context. 
It was perplexing, however, to note that most of the studies of CBNRM do not consider 
this complexity when dealing with emerging problems. It was in the same vein that this 
study undertook to expose through a systemic approach the complexity in CBNRM. The 
study was motivated from the postulation that an holistic conceptual framework could 
facilitate this attempt through a systemic analysis of a CBNRM system. 
From the foregoing and building on the findings in chapters 4 and 5, there is 
overwhelming evidence to conclude that the conceptual framework has contributed 
through a systemic approach towards exposing the complexity and centrality of 
governance in CBNRM. The concepts and heuristics of complex systems theory used by 
the framework have contributed to CBNRM by providing new insights into the dynamics 
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of complex socio-biophysical systems. This contribution provides the necessary guidance 
for the development of effective CBNRM processes and structures. Significantly, it can 
be constructively used to explicate emergent problems in CBNRM. 
This contribution notwithstanding, a number of strengths and weaknesses of the 
conceptual framework can be identified. The framework has two main strengths that are 
of critical importance to this discussion. The first lies in its ability to address the 
interrelationship between natural resource management and governance. This ability 
enabled the framework to develop distinct heuristic variables for identifying and 
analysing issues and concerns of the environment-governance nexus in a structured 
manner. Importantly, it allowed the framework to address the critical interrelationships 
between governance and natural resource utilisation. This is important, as natural 
resources will continue to play a central role in the rural development processes of 
African countries (ART, 1999). By positioning environmental governance as its core 
variable, the framework offered a niche under which the processes and structures that 
guide the behaviour of social actors in the management and utilisation of natural 
resources can be perceived. 
The second strength of the conceptual framework stems from its treatment of the concept 
of environmental governance. This concept is seen as an explicit process that includes 
two major actors (government and NOOs) in the management and utilisation of natural 
resources. Such an approach is important especially for facilitating systemic insights into 
ill-structured, complex problems associated with CBNRM partnerships. Importantly, it 
offered the framework the strength of going beyond the political power exercised by a 
government in environmental management. This is vital as it implies that environmental 
issues and concerns are not primarily a preserve of government. In essence, this treatment 
underscores the need for a more robust approach to environmental management. Such an 
approach recognises the diverse interests in society. 
Despite these strengths, the framework carries with it some weaknesses. Firstly, it uses 
aggregations such as government and NOOs in its approach. Although such an approach 
is more encompassing than the conventional frameworks, it however has two main 
89 
weaknesses. Firstly, the approach does little to address the fundamental intra- and inter-
group dynamics within each of the aggregations. This is because it is a common feature 
to fmd government officials holding divergent views on CBNRM policies and operations 
(lIED, 1994; ODA, 1996; Maughan-Brown, 1998). This is also true with NOOs that do 
not also hold unified views as to what constitutes the 'best' policy (ODA, 1996; Dimbi, 
1998; IUCN, 1998). Oiven such settings, the conceptual framework may not be 
adequately used to deal with intra- and inter-group dynamics within the aggregations. 
Hence, one needs to be extra precautious when applying it to specific institutional 
settings. 
Secondly, by using aggregations of government and NOOs, the framework may not be 
able to make predictions about individual behaviour. For instance, the personalising 
behaviour of local elites may not be easily predicted if these aggregations are used (lIED, 
1994; Murphree, 1994). Therefore, users of the framework might have a difficult time in 
explaining the outcomes of such individual behaviours. This study recognises that 
individual persons are critical to the success of CBNRM systems, and their exclusion 
could distort the assessment of particular systems. However, recognition of this weakness 
does not mean that the framework fails to conceptually capture the many interesting and 
unique features of these systems. In any case, few CBNRM processes can in practice be 
linked to individual persons (for example see Lyons, 1999; Mugabe and Tumushabe, 
1999; Veit, 1999). 
Drawing on the foregoing, it is asserted that this chapter has achieved its objective of 
revisiting the conceptual framework. It has explored the challenges and opportunities of 
applying the framework at a broader scale. The exploration has shown that the framework 
accords well with complex systems theory. Furthermore, it has illustrated that the 
framework can be positioned within the broader realm of systems thinking as a tool for 
analysing CBNRM. From this exploration, it can be argued that CBNRM in southern 
African requires the development of systems-based tools to guide policy formulation, 
implementation and analysis. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to expose through a systemic approach the complexity and 
centrality of governance in CBNRM. This was based on the premise that an appreciation 
of this complexity and of drawing analytic distinctions between governance and 
management is necessary for successful interventions. The dissertation was driven by the 
realisation that: firstly, conventional approaches to CBNRM do not appreciate the 
inherent complexity in CBNRM, and; secondly, so little is known about the complex 
interrelationships between the governance and management processes in CBNRM. 
This study identified CBNRM schemes as management systems that promote community 
participation in natural resource management. It was noted that, as management systems, 
they should be perceived as part of a larger socio-biophysical system, which is composed 
of human and biophysical components interacting as complex systems. Management 
systems, including CBNRM systems; exist along the boundary of human and biophysical 
systems. Drawing on this, it was contended that CBNRM systems should be construed as 
complex systems that exhibit organised complexity. As complex systems, they generate 
dynamic problems, which are not a purview of reductionist approaches, but systems 
thinking. This viewpoint has fundamental implications for CBNRM analyses and 
operations. It was contended that it can be detrimental to endeavour to deal with CBNRM 
issues and concerns from any other perspectives other than complex systems theory and 
systems thinking. 
The perspective of CBNRM systems as complex systems provided the study with a deep 
appreciation of the dynamics that underlie their structures and processes. Importantly, it 
was affirmed that the structures and processes should be examined in terms of 
interconnections between the components that make up these systems. Accordingly, to 
understand these components we need to understand how a particular CBNRM system 
fits into the larger system of which it is part, i.e. socio-biophysical system. In short, we 
need to perceive a CBNRM system as a component of another system, and is itself made 
up of sub-systems. 
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Given the inherent complexity in CBNRM, it was argued that the governance of natural 
resource utilisation is significant and one of the most important components of 
sustainable development. Not only can sustainable natural resource utilisation support 
effective governance, but also good governance can be a powerful tool to promote 
sustainable natural resource utilisation. However, it was surprising to observe that 
conventional conceptual frameworks of CBNRM analyses and operations do not 
explicitly address the concept of governance. These frameworks do not constructively 
appreciate the critical role governance plays in these systems. Generally, they tend to be 
confmed to technical issues. Where attempts have been made to include governance 
issues and concerns, they have more often than not been addressed on an ad hoc basis. 
Critical to this study, however, was that these frameworks employ reductionist 
approaches, which are increasingly becoming ineffective in dealing with complex 
CBNRM systems. For this reason, it was asserted that suitable and functional frameworks 
that could foster systemic analyses of CBNRM are generally lacking. 
To respond to the gap created by conventional conceptual frameworks, this study adopted 
CBEG as the core heuristic variable in a conceptual framework for analysing CBNRM. 
The application of this framework generated empirical evidence concerning CBNRM 
processes adopted in a complex context of the Kafue Flats socio-biophysical system. It 
was illustrated that CBNRM processes are established and implemented in a complex 
context whose dynamics include socio-political, economic, cultural, ecological and 
institutional forces. It was observed that social actors on the Kafue Flats did not 
constructively understand and appreciate this complexity. Several examples were 
demonstrated in which the thinking and actions of these actors reflected a limited 
I 
conceptual framework of systems thinking and the inherent complexity in CBNRM. 
Importantly, it was illustrated that these actors did not appreciate that CBNRM is a 
significant component of the governance of natural resource utilisation. This lack of 
appreciation was essentially identified as a contributing factor to poor performance. 
An important lesson to be learnt from the Kafue Flats socio-biophysical system is that 
CBNRM processes are not only about sustainable use of natural resources; but also the 
nature and quality of relationships amongst social actors in CBEG. By drawing attention 
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to these relationships, this study broadened our understanding of what goes into CBNRM 
processes. The implications of ignoring these relationships can be detrimental to the 
success of CBNRM. Ultimately, both CBEG and CBNRM processes are demanding at all 
levels of socio-political and economic interactions. They call on us to be systemic in our 
approaches and see beyond technical concerns if we are to experience meaningful results 
from interventions. 
It is argued that the establishment of productive CBNRM systems depends on how fIrmly 
CBEG issues and concerns are incorporated into CBNRM analyses and operations. The 
advancement of these systems hinges largely on the nature and quality of CBEG. 
Evidently, CBNRM cannot be pragmatically pursued in rigid socio-biophysical settings. 
It requires systemic and structural changes in the socio-political, economic and cultural 
mechanisms of CBEG. Thus, all cooperating partners, governments included, should 
accept that CBEG and CBNRM are inseparable. This understanding necessitates them to 
spearhead CBEG capacity building schemes at international, national and local levels. 
From the foregoing, it is asserted that this dissertation has made a contribution to 
CBNRM by exposing through a systemic approach the complexity and centrality of 
governance in CBNRM. It has demonstrated that CBNRM systems are established and 
implemented in a complex socio-biophysical context, which includes socio-political, 
economic, cultural, ecological and institutional forces. This study has shown that a deep 
appreciation of a system's complexity is necessary to provide a foundation for systemic 
methodologies and tools. This understanding implies that the opportunities for successful 
interventions in CBNRM are largely contingent on systemic insights into the underlying 
structures and processes responsible for emergent problems. By exposing these ~nsights 
research on CBNRM is poised to take new direction. 
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Approach 
This dissertation sought to expose through a systemic approach the complexity and 
centrality of governance in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). 
This was based on the premise that an appreciation of this complexity and of drawing 
analytic distinctions between governance and management is necessary for successful 
interventions. The dissertation was motivated by the realisation that conventional 
approaches do not appreciate the inherent complexity in CBNRM. It was also argued that 
little is known about the complex interrelationships between the governance and 
management processes in CBNRM. 
To facilitate this research, it was necessary for the researcher to draw on complex 
systems theory and systems thinking. The understanding provided by complex systems 
theory suggested that problems emerging from CBNRM are inherently multi-scale and 
involve interactions across different variables. The perspective of CBNRM systems as 
complex systems provided the study with a deep appreciation of the dynamics that 
underlie their structures and processes. Drawing on this appreciation, it was recognised 
that these structures and processes had to be examined in terms of interconnections and 
interactions between the components that make up CBNRM systems. Accordingly, it was 
deemed necessary for the study to develop and employ systems-based methods to 
facilitate a systemic framing of problem situations under conditions of irreducible 
complexity. The following section describes these methods. 
Methods 
Mental model 
Mental models are "deeply ingrained assumptions, generalisations, or even pictures or 
images that influence how we understand the world and we take action" (Senge, 1990). It 
was necessary for this study to design a mental model of a socio-biophysical system to 
provide some understanding as to how the world operates vis-a.-vis governance and 
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CBNRM. The model is a representation of human and biophysical entities interacting as 
complex systems. 
The researcher relied on the understanding generated from complex systems theory and , 
systems thinking to design the mental model. The practical experiences of the researcher 
and relevant information generated through a review of literature were also integrated 
into the design of the model. Based on this model, the study systemically constructed a 
conceptual framework for analysing CBNRM. This framework represents the hypothesis 
to be tested in this research. 
Conceptual framework 
A conceptual framework is a coherent theory that explains why a particular system is in 
the state it is, and describes the factors affecting the system (Lyons, 1999). It can be used 
to identify where CBNRM systems can be expected to have the greatest effect and how 
necessary changes can be made (McCarthy, 1996). The effectiveness of these systems 
can more often than not be linked to the validity of the conceptual frameworks upon 
which they are based. Generally, many of their failures can be directly traced to 
incomplete conceptual frameworks, and more specifically to the validity of the 
assumptions guiding their constructions (Lyons, 1999). 
This study had to adopt community-based environmental governance (CBEG) as the core 
heuristic variable in a conceptual framework to facilitate the exploration of the inherent 
complexity and centrality of governance in CBNRM. This was necessary because CBEG 
was identified as an holistic and distinct heuristic variable that could be used to 
incorporate governance, management and environmental issues and concerns in CBNRM 
analyses and operations. The framework was required to give structure and focus to the 
study. Importantly, it was needed to assist the study in identifying and describing the 
roles played by two social actors, the government and non-governmental organisations, in 
the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership. These roles are embodied in a partnership between 
these social actors. The framework was also necessary to facilitate the assessment of this 
partnership, which is being managed by the two social actors. 
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Criteria for assessing the Lochinvar CBNRM partnership 
The conceptual framework underscored the need for CBNRM partnerships to strengthen 
the legitimacy of CBEG regimes through the principles of cooperative environmental 
governance. It was conceptualised that cooperating partners are expected to operate 
productively within these principles. It followed that the nature and quality of CBNRM 
partnerships established through these principles are central to effective CBEG. By 
applying these principles, effective CBEG expects social actors to establish productive 
fOlTIlS of CBNRM partnerships. For this reason, it was necessary for the study to identify 
and establish the properties of effective CBNRM partnerships. Importantly, these 
properties had to be based on the assumptions embodied in the conceptual framework. It 
was envisaged that the properties would provide some criteria against which to assess the 
effectiveness of particular CBNRM partnerships. 
Accordingly, the study identified and established five properties of cooperative CBNRM 
partnerships. These were accountability, transparency, participation, shared governance 
and support for effective CBEG. These properties were identified as being important in 
assessing the effectiveness of particular CBNRM partnerships. Therefore, they provided 
some criteria against which to assess the field situation of the Lochinvar CBNRM 
partnership. The properties were adopted as an approach to comparing the nature and 
quality of CBEG among temporal attributes. They were assessed based on theories about 
the relationship between the observed phenomenon and the actual properties. 
Criteria for selecting Haamusonde cnu 
The Lochinvar CBNRM partnership has four community development units (CDUs). 
These are Choongo, Nalubamba, Haamusonde and Mungaila. For the purposes of this 
study, the Haamusonde CDU was selected out of the four. The selection was based on 
two main reasons. Firstly, it was the only CDU that still had elected representatives 
during the time of the field survey. Secondly, it is situated in the centre of the Kafue 
Flats, and is the closest to the main road network that is passable all year round. 
Compared to the other CDUs, Haamusonde CDU is accessible all year round, and has 
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facilities for accommodation. Thus, it was possible to study CBEG processes in this CDU 
within the given time frame. 
Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were adopted for this study as a method for gathering primary 
data. As such, it was necessary for the study to prepare an interview schedule (see 
Appendix B). According to May (1993), a major advantage of an interview schedule is 
that it makes interviewing of a number of different people more systematic and 
comprehensive by delimiting the issues to be taken up in the interviews. Based on this 
understanding, the study had to develop a set of predetermined questions that were to be 
explored during interviews. These questions served as a checklist during the interviews 
and ensured the same information was obtained from a number of key informants. 
The interviews involved direct contact between the researcher and the respondents. This 
was necessary to facilitate the identification of key issues pertinent to the study, and to 
clarify issues and correct misunderstandings. Questions were presented orally and the 
resultant responses recorded in a notebook. Key informant interviews were conducted 
with individuals that held specialised knowledge of interest and relevance to the study. 
These included Chiefs Choongo and Haamusonde, members of the Haamusonde CDU 
and senior officials from ZA W A. 
Documentary analysis 
To supplement the interviews, a documentary analysis was required to examine the 
material generated by the ZWP and L WMA. According to Peil (1982), a major advantage 
of this method is that the documents are generated contemporaneously with the events 
they refer to. As such, they are less likely to be subject to memory decay or memory 
distortion compared with data obtained from an interview. However, an important 
disadvantage is that they may be subject to selective-deposit or selective-survival (Peil, 
1982). 
A survey of documentary data relevant to the study had to be conducted. The key sources 
of the data collected from the ZWP and L WMA included community records, data-tables, 
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reports, minutes, information briefs and newsletters. These documents were a useful 
source of information on the activities and processes of the Lochinvar CBNRM system. 
They had to be reviewed and assessed for background knowledge. This approach 
generated ideas concerning the questions that were to be pursued through observations. 
Reports and files from the ZA W A had also to be examined for relevant information on 
the Kafue Flats Project Area. This information was necessary to assist the study with 
background information and factual details. 
Analysis 
The results had to be analysed qualitatively using the mental model and conceptual 
framework described above. This was necessary given the inherent complexity in 
CBNRM. A qualitative approach was thus required to facilitate a systemic framing of 
problem situations under conditions of irreducible complexity. Inferences made from 
documentary data were also used. Research studies and current discussions and published 
documents related to the study were reviewed and compared with the findings. 
Limitations 
As described above, both the mental model and conceptual framework were specifically 
designed to guide the research process. As such, they should be construed as sets of 
explicit assumptions that influenced this process to understand how the world operates 
vis-a-vis CBEG and CBNRM. The aim of the model and framework was to address 
assumptions that are strongly related to achievement in CBEG and CBNRM. Based on 
this understanding, it is cardinal to be mindful that the process had its own limitations. 
Notably, it should be realised that assumptions are always incomplete and constantly 
evolving as we interact with particular systems. In fact, they require constant adaptation 
as new information becomes available. It is, therefore, prudent to assert that both the 
model and framework were in themselves incapable of incorporating all the issues and 
concerns related to CBEG and CBNRM. The possibility exists that the model and 
framework inadvertently did not give attention to variables that could be having 
significant impacts in reality. 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Researcher's introduction 
I am Abraham Nkhata a student at University of Natal in South Africa. I am conducting a 
research on CBNRM in the Kafue Flats Game Management Area (GMA)/South Bank. 
This research will upon completion contribute to CBNRM by exposing through a 
systemic approach the complexity and centrality of governance in CBNRM systems. This 
is based on the premise that an appreciation of this complexity and of drawing analytic 
distinctions between governance and management is necessary for successful 
interventions. 
I am, therefore, kindly requesting for your permission to ask you some questions that will 
assist in informing the research. Please be advised that you are free to inform me if you 
do not feel safe in participating in this research. However, if you accept to be 
interviewed, the information that you shall give will be treated with the utmost 
confidentiality it deserves. 
Policy and legislation 
1. Do you know of any CBOs involved in CBNRM in the Kafue Flats GMA/South 
Bank? IF YES, HOW MANY? 
2. What is the purpose of the CBOs? 
3. Is the purpose of the CBOs being achieved? 
4. Is there ever a need for the CBOs to make any decisions pertaining to wildlife 
management and utilisation in the Kafue Flats GMA/South Bank? 
5. Is there ever a need for CBOs to make any decisions pertaining to community 
development in the Kafue Flats GMA/South Bank? 
6. Do CBOs ever make any decisions pertaining to wildlife management and utilisation 
in the Kafue Flats GMA/South Bank? 
7. Do CBOs ever make any decisions pertaining to community development in the 
Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? 
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8. What decisions do CBOs make pertaining to wildlife management and utilisation in 
the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? (Strategic, operational, or tactical). 
9. What decisions do CBOs make pertaining to community development in the Kafue 
Flats GMAISouth Bank? (Strategic, operational, or tactical). 
Organisation and operations 
10. Do you know any member of a CBO in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? 
11. Do you trust CBO members? WHY? 
12. Do you have any expectations from CBOs? IF NO, WHY? 
13. What are your expectations from CBOs? 
14. Are your expectations from CBOs ever met? IF NEVER, WHY? 
15. Do CBOs ever infotnl you about their decisions and activities pertaining to wildlife 
management and utilisation in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? IF NEVER, WHY? 
16. Do CBOs ever infOtnl you about their decisions and activities pertaining to 
community development in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? IF NEVER, WHY? 
17. Are you ever aware that your community is given money through the CBOs from the 
revenue generated from wildlife utilisation by ZA WA? IF NEVER, WHY? 
18. How did you know that your community is given money through the CBOs from the 
revenue generated from wildlife utilisation by ZA W A? 
19. Do you know how the money that is given to the community through the CBOs is 
utilised? IF NEVER, WHY? 
20. Do CBOs ever implement the decisions that they make pertaining to wildlife 
management and utilisation in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? 
21. Do CBOs ever implement the decisions that they make pertaining to community 
development in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? 
109 
22. What hinders the implementation of the decisions that are made by CBOs pertaining 
to wildlife management and utilisation in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? 
23. What hinders the implementation of the decisions that are made by CBOs pertaining 
to community development in the Kafue Flats GMAISouth Bank? 
24. Do you ever have opinions that you feel can contribute towards the effective 
operation of CBOs? IF NEVER, WHY? 
25. Have you ever attempted to contribute your opinions towards the effective operation 
of CBOs? IF NEVER, WHY? 
26. Are your opinions that you feel can contribute towards the effective operation of 
CBOs ever considered by the CBO members? IF NEVER, WHY? 
27. Do CBOs need any power and authority to carry out their functions as custodians of 
wildlife resources? WHY? 
28. Do CBOs need any power and authority to carry out their functions as custodians of 
community development programs and projects? WHY? 
29. What kind of power and authority do CBOs need to carry out their functions as 
custodians of wildlife resources? 
30. What kind of power and authority do CBOs need to carry out their functions as 
custodians of community development programs and projects? 
31. Are there any individuals or groups or organisations that impact positively on the 
operations of CBOs? 
32. Are there any individuals or groups or organisations that impact negatively on the 
operations of CBOs? 
110 
33. What individuals or groups or organisations impact positively on the operations of 
CBOs? 
34. What individuals or groups or organisations impact negatively on the operations of 
CBOs?HOW? 
35. Do CBOs ever have any conflicts with other individuals or groups or organisations? 
36. What conflicts do CBOs have with other individuals or groups or organisations? 
37. How are conflicts managed/resolved by CBOs? 
38. Do you feel that there is ever co-operation between CBOs and the local communities? 
39. Do you feel that there is ever co-operation amongst all the four CBOs in the Kafue 
Flats GMNSouth Bank? 
40. Do you feel that there is ever co-operation between CBOs and Zambia Wildlife 
Authority (ZA W A)? 
41. Is there a need to have women and youth represented in CBOs? 
42. Do you have any women and youth in CBOs? If yes, how many of each? 
43. How do CBOs involve women and youth in decision-making? 
44. Do you feel there should be separate wildlife committees for women and youth 
respectively? 
